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Global Displacement Forecast 2022

Photo: Jan Grarup



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About DRC

DRC is present and active in the major displacement crises globally. DRC is actively responding to humanitarian emergencies as they unfold by working to ensure the right to life, liberty and security of people, and to ensure access to basic needs such as food, water, sanitation, housing and medical care. DRC is also engaging in responding to protracted displacement situations and supports implementation of activities that reduce displacement-related risks and vulnerabilities and facilitate access to durable solutions. Lastly, DRC is working on addressing the causes of forced displacement, through building economic, environmental and conflict resilience in displacement-affected communities. The two main goals that guide our work are: 1) People affected by conflict and displacement must be able to seek safety and claim basic rights and 2) People affected by conflict and displacement must be able to pursue self-reliance. DRC has identified four strategic programme initiatives that guide the work: Improving protection of the hard-to-reach, expanding access to legal aid, supporting better market access for all and reinforcing climate and conflict resilience.

About the Foresight Model

The Foresight model can, with a high degree of accuracy, forecast the cumulative number of forcibly displaced people one to three years into the future. The model uses more than 120 indicators related to conflict, governance, economy, environment and population/society to forecast the future displacement. The model has been employed to forecast the cumulative number of people displaced from some 26 countries. The countries included in the model account for approximately 87% of all global displacement or a combined total of 73 million people displaced in 2021. Approximately ½ of the forecasts made with the tool are less than 10% off the actual number of people living in displacement in the coming year.

The forecasts tend to be conservative, i.e. underestimate the level of displacement in the coming year. It further has limited ability to forecast unprecedented events or high surges in displacement.

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Executive Summary

Predicted doubling of forced displacement between 2014-2023 will disproportionately affect poorer countries. The combined forecasts from the Foresight model for the 26 countries covered suggest that the total number of people displaced (internally displaced persons, asylum seekers and refugees) will increase by 2.9 million in 2022 and an additional 3.9 million in 2023 entailing a total increase of 6.8 million. This means that by 2023, the number of displaced people will have almost doubled since 2014 and will have increased by more than 35 million people. The forecasted displacement suggests that the number of displaced people living in sub-Saharan Africa will increase by more than 5 million by the end of 2023, whereas in the same period the number of displaced people in Europe is estimated to increase by less than 50,000.

War, crisis and conflict - where human rights abuses, persecution, violence and living conditions worsened in 2021 - are the main factors contributing to increased displacement in 2022. Overall, violence against civilians rose by 22% in 2021 compared to 2020 in the 26 countries covered by the model. More than 130,000 fatalities due to conflict incidents were recorded. The change in the number of conflict events, the total number of fatalities and total number of civilian fatalities are the three main predictors of displacement for the coming year. Yet displacement is often the result of complex interactions between, for example, human rights abuses, violence, economic deterioration and environmental degradation. People decide whether to flee or not by evaluating how the different factors pose a risk to their safety, assets and well-being. Deciding to leave is seldom the first option people resort to when faced with an unstable situation. Many live in chronically unstable areas for long periods of time without deciding to flee. Yet more and more people have to resort to fleeing as situations continue to escalate, trigger events emerge and the underlying complex crises are not being resolved. While seven peace agreements were signed in the first six months (H1) of 2021, three were in Mali alone. In 2019 there were four times as many peace agreements in H1 than in 2021.¹ The limited progress on resolving conflicts means that it is likely that at least two refugee situations from the 26 countries of focus will be added to the list of 49 protracted displacement situations in 2022. With the ability to forecast displacement, the international community has an opportunity to prepare for, respond to and try to prevent the displacement and related needs from materialising. But by doing nothing, nothing will be done. When the data and the analysis all point in the same direction, the excuses for inaction disappear.

Action is needed to address displacement crises that are likely to deteriorate severely in the coming two years. Displacement from **Burkina Faso** is forecasted to increase by more than 400,000 people (26% increase) in 2022. Burkina Faso has become the epicentre of violence in the Central Sahel region and tied to violence in Mali and Niger. **Afghanistan** is another country where significant displacement is forecasted in 2022 following the Taliban takeover and dire humanitarian situation in the country. By 2023, **South Sudan** is forecasted to see an increase of almost 600,000 displaced (14% increase) compared to 2021. Despite the formation of a unity government and ceasefire agreement, violence and displacement continue in the country. **Ethiopia** is another country that by 2023 is forecasted to have witnessed significant increase (21%) in displacement. The country is faced with violent conflict in the Tigray region marked by significant human rights violations. Other countries with significant displacement forecasted include DR Congo, Cameroon, Nigeria, Somalia and Yemen.

Funds are lacking and unevenly distributed; does not follow increased displacement and needs. Funding constraints continue to hamper humanitarian response to displacement and humanitarian needs. Looking at the current forecasts for 2022 and 2023, crises where humanitarian funding and attention from the international community is lacking, displacement is forecasted to increase significantly. In countries where humanitarian response plans were more than 50% funded in 2021, displacement is forecasted to increase by 59,000 people on average, whereas in countries where the funding is less than 50%, it is forecasted to increase by 160,000 on average.

Most of the displaced are not crossing borders. Globally, around 57% of the displaced in 2021 are internally displaced. The forecasts suggests that the number of IDPs will grow by 11%, while the number of refugees and asylum seekers will only

¹ Bell, C. and Badanjak, S. (2019) 'Introducing PA-X: A new peace agreement database and dataset', *Journal of Peace Research* 56 (3)

grow by 5% between 2021 and 2023. As such, of the 6.8 million forecasted increase in displacement, 5.5 million of the displaced people will remain in their countries of origin, while 1.3 million is forecasted to flee to seek international protection.

Those in most need are often difficult to reach – and the situation is getting worse. 17 of the 26 countries are categorised as having either very high or extreme humanitarian access constraints. Eleven of the 26 countries further witnessed a deteriorating trend when it comes to humanitarian access.² The importance of the issue is underscored by the fact that the forecasted displacement is on average higher in countries with poor humanitarian access. Countries with extreme access constraints, such as Syria, Yemen, Nigeria and Somalia are forecasted to see an average increase of 490,000 people displaced in the period 2021 to 2023. In countries categorised as having only moderate access constraints – El Salvador, Burundi and Guatemala – average displacement is forecasted to increase by only 26,000.

These constraints are exacerbated by the fact that **40 million displaced people will be living in some of the poorest countries in the world**, with limited means to provide adequate support to people in displacement. In 2014 only about 1/3 of displaced persons or 9 million were living in low-income countries. Today it is estimated to be 36 million and by 2023 it is forecasted to increase to 40 million people in low-income countries. To put this into perspective, more than 32 million displaced people are living in the 25 countries with a GDP per capita below 1,000 USD, while only approximately 7 million are living in the 62 countries with a GDP per capita above 10,000 USD. These poorer countries, often struggling with conflict and displacement themselves, do not have the necessary means or capacity to respond to the significant humanitarian needs within their borders.

Prevent and stop conflicts, ensure protection, predictable funding and responsibility-sharing. It should be noted that despite the significant focus in several high-income countries on deterring displaced people from seeking asylum, even going so far as in engaging in violent, unlawful pushbacks and fortifying the borders with fences, walls and barbed wire, only a very small share of displaced people worldwide is coming to western countries. While there is an intense focus on avoiding large-scale refugee movements, the same countries are showing limited commitment to resettlement of vulnerable refugees, providing the needed humanitarian funding to respond to the humanitarian challenges and political and diplomatic engagement in solving the crises and ensuring humanitarian access. This highlights that despite the intentions and commitments made within the framework of the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), three years on, very limited progress has been made to ensure more predictable and equitable sharing of responsibility. The forecasts underscore that displacement will continue to grow as long as concerted efforts to address the root causes of displacement, and funding to respond to the needs that arise as a consequence, remain below what is required.

Recommendations

The forecasts highlight the pressing need for global solutions, responsibility-sharing and solidarity. The Danish Refugee Council (DRC) calls on donors and host governments to:

1. Shift the narrative and paradigm on displacement from one of threat and securitisation to one of human rights and protection of vulnerable people at risk. This entails recognising displaced people as human beings with inalienable rights to life and dignity, and acknowledging that it is a collective global responsibility to ensure they can enjoy these rights.
2. Promote durable solutions to displacement and uphold the principles enshrined in the Global Compact on Refugees. In particular, the findings in this report highlight the need for the international community to urgently prioritise more equitable and predictable responsibility-sharing towards international protection of refugees. This should include recognising that existing resettlement targets are insufficient and governments should commit to increase and expand third-country solutions including resettlement.
3. Increase long-term predictable funding levels to match the needs of people affected by crisis and displacement to avoid further suffering and increase in needs, and prevent further displacement. Increased funding is needed to ease the pressures on host countries and support displaced people's self-reliance. As such, development actors, including the multilateral development banks must play a larger role in financing response to protracted forced displacement and support host countries at the outset of refugee situations to incentivise refugee-friendly policies.
4. Scale-up political and diplomatic efforts in addressing the root causes of displacement and humanitarian needs. This includes recognising that displacement happens in a complex interplay between a variety of factors. Therefore, such efforts need to focus on ending violence and on addressing human rights abuses, state legitimacy and capacity, and economic inequality.
5. Hold parties in conflicts accountable for international humanitarian law including facilitating unimpeded humanitarian access to displacement-affected communities to ensure that all critical, life-saving support is possible. This includes ensuring the safety of displacement-affected communities when receiving assistance, and the safety of humanitarian workers delivering assistance. Civilians and aid workers are not targets.

Introduction

The Foresight tool was developed by DRC together with IBM with funding from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was finalised in 2021. The tool can, with a high degree of accuracy, forecast the cumulative number of forcibly displaced people one to three years into the future. DRC uses the tool to support country operations as well as the wider humanitarian system with more accurate forecasts for strategic planning for better prevention, response and protection to displacement-affected populations. The model has been employed to forecast the cumulative number of people displaced from 26 countries that have ongoing and evolving displacement crises. These countries account for approximately 87% of all global displacement or an estimated total of 73 million people displaced in 2021.

In July 2021 DRC applied the newly developed Foresight model for the first time to project the number of displaced people in 2021. At the time the Foresight model projected that the number of displaced people would increase by 3.7 million in 2021 in the countries covered. While official figures on the total displacement in 2021 are yet to be released, our calculations suggest that the number of displaced people has increased by more than 4 million. This amounts to more than 10,000 people every day in 2021 being forced to flee their homes.

This report presents the forecasted forced displacement in 2022 and 2023. Forced displacement is defined as refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced people (IDPs). The official number of people displaced in 2021 for the countries covered in the model will not be available until later in 2022. Therefore, the level of displacement in 2021 has been estimated based on the latest available displacement updates from agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In most cases the number of internally displaced people in 2021 is available to the end of November 2021, while the number of externally displaced (refugees and asylum seekers) is mostly available to the end of June. The forecasts are thus preliminary in nature and will be updated once the final, official numbers on the level of displacement in 2021 are available around June 2022. The report therefore also only presents the change in displacement forecasted and does not forecast the total number of people living in displacement.


The report presents an overview of the forecasts of displacement in 2022 and 2023 and highlights key trends and patterns in the forecasts. The report explores the situation in some of the countries where significant displacement has been forecasted either for 2022 or 2023, looking at the underlying drivers of displacement, how the situation is evolving in 2022 and how the DRC is responding to the situation.

The report also presents the findings from a Bayesian network analysis of key displacement drivers, unpacking the complex dynamics that cause displacement and some of the key predictors of displacement.

Displacement Forecast

Overview

Combining the forecasts for the 26 countries covered in the model, the cumulative number of people displaced is forecasted to increase by 2.9 million people in 2022. This number is projected to increase by another 3.9 million in 2023 entailing a total increase of 6.8 million between 2021 and 2023. The developments show that in the 10-year period from 2014 to 2023, displacement is looking to almost double, increasing by more than 35 million people. These developments will likely trigger significant increases in humanitarian needs and needs for durable solutions in the coming years. OCHA is projecting that more than 274 million people will be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2022 requiring USD 41 billion in funding.³ There are some clear geographical trends in the forecasts. Of the 6.8 million forecasted to be displaced by the end of 2023, more than 5 million are estimated to be living in sub-Saharan Africa and the region's share of the total number of hosted displaced people will increase from 44% to 47%. At the other end of the spectrum, Europe and North America are estimated to see a combined increase of 150,000 hosted displaced people.



The increased displacement in 2022 is driven in particular by significant growth forecasted in DR Congo, Afghanistan and Burkina Faso, where combined displacement is forecasted to increase by almost 1.3 million. Other countries such as Cameroon, Nigeria, South Sudan and Sudan are also projected to experience significant displacement increases in 2022. In 2023, while projections are more uncertain, significant increases are also forecasted in countries such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia and Yemen. For other countries, such as Iraq and Libya, the displacement situation is projected to improve slightly and displacement is forecasted to decrease in 2022.

There are also countries that are expected to see significant relative increases in displacement. In Chad, the number of people displaced is forecasted to increase by 25% in 2022 and in Mali a 15% increase is forecasted. In 2023, Niger is forecasted to experience a 44% increase in displacement compared to 2021, while Mozambique is expected to see a 37% increase, and El Salvador a 24% increase.

Looking at the forecasts from a regional perspective, West Africa⁴ and East Africa⁵ have the highest forecasted growth in the number of displaced people. In West Africa, the number of displaced people is forecasted to grow by 13%, while in 2023, the number of displaced people in East Africa is forecasted to grow by 14%. As such, by the end of 2023 East Africa is forecasted to have seen a growth in displacement of 21% and West Africa 25% since end-2021. ⁶ Other regions are expected to see fairly stable increases of around 3% annually, with the exception of Europe and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, where a decline is projected.

Conflict is a key driver of displacement, as highlighted in the section on 'displacement DNA'. In 2021 there was a significant increase in the number of incidents of violence against civilians, which rose by 22% in the 26 countries of focus, while battle incidents overall remained at the same level as in 2020. Countries such as Myanmar, Colombia, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia were among those that witnessed significant increases in incidents of battles and violence against civilians. Despite this, significant increases in displacement have not been forecasted in Myanmar and Colombia. Overall, there was a 30% increase in fatalities from conflict events, with more than 130,000 fatalities recorded. However, 11 of the 26 countries witnessed a decline in fatalities. The increase in fatalities was largely driven by events in Myanmar, which saw an increase from 659 in 2020 to more than 11,000, making Myanmar the country with the third-highest number of fatalities behind Afghanistan and Yemen. Other countries that saw significant increases include Central African Republic and Ethiopia, where the number of fatalities in 2021 was more than double that in 2020. At the other end of the spectrum, progress towards peace and stability in Libya has brought a significant decline in conflict incidents and fatalities.⁷ However, efforts by local and international actors have yet to significantly change the facts on the ground in the 25 other countries. Globally, only seven peace agreements materialised in the first half of 2021, which is significantly below the 10 in the first half of 2020 and the 28 agreements in the first half of 2019. Three of the seven agreements in 2021 were local peace agreements between the Dogon community in Mali and other communities and groups. Other agreements were made in Sudan, South Sudan, Senegal and between India and Pakistan.⁸

Given the lack of progress in resolving conflicts, people displaced will have limited opportunities to return and will be remaining in their host areas. As such, it is expected that at least two refugee situations from the 26 countries of focus will be added to the list of 49 protracted displacement situations⁹ in 2022: Syrian refugees in Sudan and refugees from Cameroon in Nigeria. In 2023, refugees from Central African Republic in Sudan and from DR Congo in Kenya are also likely to be added to the list.

Almost 50% of the displaced persons in 2021 are hosted in low-income countries. With the forecasted displacement, this share is estimated to increase slightly¹⁰, while hosting in upper-middle-income and high-income countries is expected to decrease. In comparison, in 2014 only about 1/3 of displaced persons or 9.2 million were living in low-income countries. Today it is estimated to be 36 million and by 2023 it is forecasted to increase to 40 million people in low-income countries. To put this into perspective, more than 32 million displaced persons are living in 25 countries with a GDP per capita below 1,000 USD, while only approximately 7 million are living in 62 countries with a GDP per capita above 10,000 USD. There are also clear geographical patterns to this.

4 West Africa includes Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Mali

5 East Africa includes Burundi, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia and South Sudan

6 Latin America includes Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Venezuela; MENA region includes Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria and Yemen; Asia includes Afghanistan and Myanmar; Europe includes Ukraine

7 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED): acleddata.com

8 Bell, C. and Badanjak, S. (2019): 'Introducing PA-X: A new peace agreement database and dataset', *Journal of Peace Research*, 56 (3)

9 UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as one in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for at least five consecutive years in a given host country

10 This assumes that the future displacement will have the same distribution to hosting countries as in 2020




Figure 1: Distribution of people displaced from the 26 countries in focus. Circles represent total displaced from the country with the colored part showing the share that are IDPs.

As shown above, most displaced people stay in their country of origin or move to neighboring countries. So as growth in displacement is primarily increasing in East and West Africa, so is hosting. The number of displaced people living in sub-Saharan Africa is set to increase by more than 5 million by the end of 2023, while Europe and North America is estimated to see an increase of less than 150,000 in total. This is because displacement tends to happen in low- and lower-middle-income countries and forecasts are on average higher in countries with a higher share of internally displaced. In the 14 countries where more than 75% of displaced people are internally displaced, the average forecasted growth in displacement in 2022 is 7%. In countries where less than 75% of displaced people are internally displaced, the average forecasted growth is only 2%. The countries with a high share of internally displaced persons include Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Yemen. Overall, the forecasts suggests that the number of IDPs will grow by 11%, while the number of refugees and asylum seekers will only grow by 5% between 2021 and 2023. As such, of the 6.8 million forecasted increase in displacement, 5.5 million of the displaced people will remain in their countries of origin, while 1.3 million is forecasted to flee to seek international protection.

Hosting in low-income countries is also a result of the limited progress on realising durable solutions to displacement, including the lack of resettlement of refugees from low-income hosting countries. In 2020, only 34,000 people were resettled to 21 countries – the lowest number in two decades.¹¹ This trend continued into 2021, with only about 16,000 resettlements by 30 June 2021 according to UNHCR. However, this number is set to increase because of the extraordinary resettlement efforts following the Taliban takeover of Kabul. In addition, around 20,000 refugees were naturalised in the first six months of 2021. The number of IDPs and refugees who have returned is significantly higher than resettlement and naturalisations, as slightly more than 1 million returned in the first six months of 2021, mostly from low-income and lower-middle-income hosting countries. However, this number is significantly lower than the number of returns in 2019 and 2020, which reflects the limited progress on solving conflicts and persecution. In 2020, more than 3.3 million people were able to return; in 2019, 5.6 million people returned.¹² A recent study implemented by DRC, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) confirms these trends. Evaluating the impact of the GCR, which was developed to, among things, address this issue by providing a framework for more predictable and equitable responsibility-sharing, confirms that three years on limited progress has been made. Third-country solutions have decreased, rather than increased and efforts to broaden the number of states actively contributing to international refugee protection has been fruitless.¹³

¹¹ UNHCR (18 June 2021): *Global Trends in Forced Displacement - 2020*

¹² UNHCR: Refugee Data Finder, <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics>

¹³ DRC, IRC, NRC (November 2021): *The Global Compact on Refugees Three Years On: Navigating barriers and maximising incentives in support of refugees and host countries*

Given that solutions to displacement are decreasing and given continued high levels of conflict and prosecution, humanitarian access is a key concern. Of the 26 countries covered in the model, 17 are categorised as having either very high or extreme humanitarian access constraints and 11 have witnessed a deteriorating trend when it comes to humanitarian access.¹⁴ The importance of the issue is underscored by the fact that the forecasted displacement is on average higher in countries with poor humanitarian access. Countries with extreme access constraints, such as Syria, Yemen, Nigeria and Somalia are forecasted to see an average increase of 490,000 people displaced from 2021 to 2023. In countries categorised as facing high access constraints, such as Burkina Faso, Libya, Colombia and Ukraine, the average increase is forecasted at 153,000 people displaced; however, if Burkina Faso is disregarded, this number falls to 36,000 on average. Lastly, in countries categorised as having only moderate access constraints, such as El Salvador, Burundi and Guatemala, average displacement is only forecasted to increase by 23,000. One explanation for this is that humanitarian access appears to be more constrained in more populous countries.

Another concern related to the issue of access, is the lack of funding provided to many of the crises where significant displacement is forecasted to increase. The average growth in displacement in 2022 projected for countries where the 2021 Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs) were less than 50% funded, is 59,000 people on average; whereas in countries where the funding is less than 50%, the average growth in displacement is 160,000 people on average. Analysis of funding and displacement trends in more than 100 HRPs corroborates these findings. When response plans were less than 50% funded, the cumulative number of people displaced the following year increased by 36% on average. If the plans were more than 75% funded, the increase in displacement was only 10% on average. The lack of humanitarian funding means the humanitarian community cannot respond adequately to alleviate the suffering and ensure protection of vulnerable groups, implement early action and prevention activities and increase the resilience of displacement-affected communities. In 2021, 48% of the required funding for humanitarian response plans was provided – almost USD 1 billion less than funding in 2020. In 2020, 50% of the required humanitarian funding was provided, compared to 63% in 2019. Among the countries of focus in the model, Colombia, Venezuela, Sudan, DR Congo and Mali were among the least funded in 2021 with only around one-third of the required funding being provided.

An overview of the specific forecasts for displacement in each of the 26 countries is available in the annex.

Country Deep Dives

Afghanistan

Country Context

Afghanistan has been deemed the worst current humanitarian crisis in the world. In 2022 more than 24.4 million are in need of humanitarian assistance – an approximate 33% increase in the number of people in need and the third-highest number in the world.¹⁵

2021 marked a significant shift in the Afghanistan crisis as the Taliban took control of the country. Following the announcement of the withdrawal of US and international troops from Afghanistan, the Taliban in May began to advance across the country taking control of rural and northern areas. Over the course of two months, the Taliban was able to gain control of approximately one-quarter of Afghanistan's 400 districts. By July, the Taliban also controlled border crossings to Tajikistan, Iran and Pakistan. On 15 August, the Taliban entered Kabul marking the culmination of the military campaign. In September, the Taliban forces gained control of the province of Panjshir where some former Afghan leaders attempted to establish an armed resistance to the Taliban.¹⁶ Following this, episodes of violence and battles have decreased to the lowest levels in many years.¹⁷

However, the situation remains fragile. The Islamic State of Khorasan Province (IS-K) has resurfaced in Afghanistan with a number of high-profile attacks following the Taliban capture of Kabul. It emerged in Afghanistan in 2015 after ISIS declared its caliphate in Iraq and Syria and today has the goal of establishing a 'pure' Islamic system in Afghanistan. Its military capacity was significantly weakened up until 2020 as a result of concerted efforts by the Taliban, the former Afghan government and US military. Since May 2020 the group has shifted tactics and is targeting urban areas. During the Taliban advance and takeover, many IS-K prisoners were able to flee captivity and rejoin the group and IS-K may now be able to attract further support from people and groups opposed to the Taliban. These developments could lead IS-K to increase violence and attacks.¹⁸ IS-K carried out more attacks in the last four months of 2021 than in the first eight months of 2021.¹⁹ There is a significant risk that this will continue in 2022, especially in the east of the country.

In addition to IS-K, resistance factions could emerge, such as witnessed in Panjshir, which could destabilise the situation further and opposition groups might emerge in other areas. Lastly, internal fractures in the Taliban movement could also be a destabilising factor, with some reports suggesting disagreement between the military and political wing of the Taliban.²⁰

Such opposing factions, and factions within the Taliban, could gain impetus as a result of the population's frustration with the dire situation in the country; such frustration has already prompted a number of demonstrations against the Taliban. The Afghan economy was already in a poor state following years of corruption and the deep impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and drought. In the wake of the Taliban takeover, the country is now faced with one of the worst economic shocks in global history. Approximately \$8 billion in international development aid – equivalent to around 40% of Afghanistan's GDP – has been withdrawn, the de facto authorities is facing economic sanctions and Afghanistan's \$9 billion foreign exchange reserves have been frozen.²¹ Estimates suggests that Afghanistan will face an economic contraction by around 20% of GDP within a year, which may reach 30% in the following years. Inflation is accelerating in the country and the exchange rate is depreciating, which is leading to higher costs for the imported goods the country relies on. Liquidity in the banking sector is very limited and there is considerable risk of financial instability.²² The economic fall-out is having a devastating impact.

15 OCHA (2 December 2021): *Global Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022*

16 Clayton Thomas (2 November 2021): *Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Service

17 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED): acleddata.com

18 Asfandiyar Mir (21 September 2021): *What Does IS-K's Resurgence Mean for Afghanistan and Beyond?* United States Institute for Peace

19 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED): acleddata.com

20 Clayton Thomas (2 November 2021): *Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Service

21 William Byrd (17 November 2021): *Key to Afghan Relief Efforts: Financial Engineering for Private Sector, Economy*, United States Institute for Peace

22 UNDP (30 November 2021): *Afghanistan: Socio-Economic Outlook 2021-2022*

Basic social services are severely disrupted, with doctors, nurses, teachers, etc. not receiving pay and basic medical supplies not being available. The impact is particularly affecting the urban population, including civil servants and their families, who also comprise some of the groups most vulnerable to the Taliban's actions.²³ Rural areas are also affected by the financial fallout, and are facing one of the worst droughts in 27 years. All in all, 55% of the population are expected to be in crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity (IPC 3+), with some 9 million in IPC 4 level – the highest number in the world. Given the protracted nature of the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, there is very limited resilience capacity in the population: people have already depleted their limited reserves and are now having to resort to irreversible coping mechanisms to survive.²⁴ Projections suggest that 90% of the population will be living in poverty by mid-2022.²⁵

The situation is not looking to improve. While limited official information has been provided on potential new policies issued by the de facto authorities, there have so far been numerous examples of protesters being suppressed, demonstrators beaten, and journalists detained. Girls' access to education appears to be effectively limited or banned and women are discouraged from working in a number of sectors. Brutal law enforcement practices also seem to be returning, including public executions.²⁶ Summary execution or enforced disappearance of 47 former members of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) who had surrendered to or were apprehended by Taliban forces between 15 August and 31 October 31 have been documented.²⁷ Limited freedom of religion and expression and limited freedom of movement are also concerns. Discriminatory and punitive gender norms have further been identified as an increased protection threat. As such, there remains major concern for the upholding of Afghans' basic human rights, especially the protection of people belonging to certain groups such as human rights defenders, ex-soldiers, ex-government employees, journalists, and people belonging to religious, ethnic and other minority groups.²⁸ In particular, members of the Hazara ethnic group face a significant risk of persecution. Afghanistan is ranked fourth in the world for risk of mass killing²⁹ in 2021-2022. The underlying statistical model estimates that there is an 11% risk of new mass killing beginning in Afghanistan in 2022.³⁰ Thus, human rights and protection challenges abound and some 16.2 million people will require protection assistance in 2022.³¹

The many IDPs in the country are particularly vulnerable in the current situation and Afghanistan is ranked as one of the countries with the most severe conditions facing IDPs. Many IDPs are in urban areas in poor living conditions and with limited access to livelihood opportunities. Furthermore, many IDP settlements are in areas contaminated with explosive hazards.³² The ability of IDPs and host communities to obtain support has also been affected by the Taliban takeover. More than three-quarters of OCHA partners (89 organisations) have noted an impact on programme delivery since the takeover and more than half of those partners have had their programmes suspended or put into hibernation.³³

Displacement Forecast

While episodes of conflict and direct violence may be less of concern going forward, the severe conditions facing the population and significant concerns related to protection, human rights, livelihoods and access to services as well as continued drought, will likely mean that displacement will persist. If conflict levels remain low, and the Taliban acts in a way that can open up dialogue with the international community and engages with opposition groups to create inclusive governance displacement may be limited and mainly driven by the continued drought, limited livelihood opportunities and lack of social services. However, if the de facto authorities continues to restrict basic human rights, sanctions will continue to hamper the economy, and poverty and humanitarian needs will soar. This could lead to significant increases in internal and external displacement.³⁴ Based on the developments in Afghanistan, the Foresight model is predicting that the cumulative number of people displaced from Afghanistan will increase by more than 330,000 in 2023. The number of

23 William Byrd (14 October 2021): *Afghanistan's Economic and Humanitarian Crises Turn Dire*, United State Institute for Peace

24 OCHA (2 December 2021): *Global Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022*

25 UNDP (30 November 2021): *Afghanistan: Socio-Economic Outlook 2021-2022*

26 Andrew Watkins, Ambassador Richard Olson, Asfandyar Mir & Kate Bateman (28 September 2021): *Taliban Seek Recognition, But Offer Few Concessions to International Concerns*, United State Institute for Peace

27 Human Rights Watch (30 November 2021): *"No Forgiveness for People Like You": Executions and Enforced Disappearances in Afghanistan under the Taliban*

28 Protection Cluster Afghanistan (10 November 2021): *Afghanistan: Protection Analysis Update 2021 - Quarter 3*

29 Mass killing is defined as 1,000 or more civilians deliberately killed by armed forces (whether government or non-state), over a period of a year or less, because of their membership in a particular group

30 Early Warning Project (November 2021): *Countries at Risk of Mass Killing 2021-22*, Simon-Skjoldt Center for the Prevention of Genocide of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum & the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College


31 OCHA (2 December 2021): *Global Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022*

32 Alesia O'Connor & Chloe Sydney (2 November 2021): *Severity of internal displacement – 2021 report*, Internal Displacement Monitoring Center

33 OCHA (31 October 2021): *Afghanistan: Rapid Capacity Survey - Summary Report (October)*

34 ACAPS (31 October 2021): *Displacement and Access in Afghanistan: Scenarios*

displaced people is expected to increase by 375,000 in 2023, making a total increase in displacement of more than 700,000 between 2021 and 2023.



DRC Presence

DRC has been present in Afghanistan since the 1990s and is one of the primary humanitarian actors. DRC has a robust operational capacity, responding to the needs of returnees from both Pakistan and Iran, as well as the highly vulnerable IDPs. As of 2021, DRC works in 21 provinces in Afghanistan, with activities in multiple sectors.

DRC remains committed to maintaining a widespread geographic footprint in Afghanistan because of the continuum of needs in the country and of its people. DRC remained operational during the COVID-19 emergency and intends to continue growing based on need. In particular, DRC sees multi-purpose cash assistance as the primary avenue for humanitarian aid, as this form of cash allows households to determine how they will support their individual needs and provides dignity and self-determination for displacement-affected people. DRC will continue to advocate for more funding to grow its early recovery and development portfolio, working in partnership with the government and other actors on initiatives that have long-term impacts. DRC particularly sees opportunities to do this through social protection and governance initiatives managed by the government. This can be an impossible task without the international community's active support to enable humanitarian and development actors to deliver early recovery as well as resilience-building both at the place of origin and at the place of displacement. This support is critical if displacement-affected people are to be able to consider return or integration and reach durable solutions to their displacement.

“Many of my colleagues are in prison, some were shot”

Following the Taliban takeover summary execution or enforced disappearance of 47 former members of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) who had surrendered to or were apprehended by Taliban forces between 15 August and 31 October 2021 have been documented. In Zaranj, on the border to Iran, Ahmed (name changed), who previously worked with ANSF wants to leave Afghanistan with his wife and three kids. It is January 2022, and he has been planning to leaving Afghanistan since 2019, but the rapid takeover by the Taliban caught him by surprise and he did not manage to leave in time.

“When the security situation got worse in 2019, everyone started talking about leaving the country, especially my colleagues. You know, we were in the army, and we witnessed what was going on in the country, how districts by districts fell into the hands of insurgents. What mostly worried us was the lack of willingness from the government to fight back. And that was why many soldiers and army staff left, as they didn’t want to be killed in vain. Since then, I was thinking about leaving or at least sending my family somewhere safe, because we knew if something happened and Talib gets the country, then we are the most vulnerable and exposed to their revenge. But I didn’t think that the country would fall so quickly. Otherwise, I would be prepared and left the country earlier on.

When they took Mazar I was in Kunduz with other soldiers, surprised. So, everyone was fleeing to their homes, so I did the same and put on a civil-

ian cloth and went back to Mazar-e-Sharif. I didn’t dare to go directly to my house, I first sent word to my family that I’m alive and in the city and asked them to come to a relative’s house. Since then, we were living there in hiding, fearing that if we go back to our house they will identify and execute us. And actually, they were looking for former soldiers. Many of my colleagues are in prison, some were shot. I knew the situation will not get better and Talibs will continue looking for people like us for revenge.”

“I went to Kabul with my family to see if there was a chance of being evacuated to another country. I took all my documents, education certificates, work contracts, and proof that I am a soldier in the Afghan Army and therefore at risk. I printed all the photos I had with our foreign military personnel who trained us years before. We reached Kabul airport the day before the explosion. We were at Qasaba gate and heard the blast. After that, foreign countries stopped evacuations and we went back to Mazar after two days.”

On the day he left Mazar to cross the Iranian border, Ahmed had to leave behind his parents and relatives without knowing if he would ever see them again.

“Of course, it wasn’t easy. I only could say goodbye to my parents and my wife’s family. All other friends and relatives in Afghanistan, I couldn’t go there for farewell or even dare to call them because there is a rumor that Taliban had brought Pakistani experts to listen to the calls to identify those who were collaborating with the former government.

I left my house and all my belonging without be able to have a last look at them, and just brought my wife and children with me. My mother and father are old, and my wife took good care of them, but now they are at the mercy of my cousin’s family. My children are also small and do not understand why we are leaving Afghanistan. They are crying all the time. It was only a few months that my daughter was going to school and now she misses her friends and is asking all the time ‘when I will go again to my class?’. I don’t know what to say except that she will go to a new school soon, but still she is not convinced. I love her very much and it really hurts me to see her like this. While we were in Mazar, two-three days before our departure, she heard that Talib soldiers come to houses and take young girls with them as their brides and she asked me if Talibs is going to take her away. It broke my heart and I didn’t know what to answer. She is only a child!”

“I didn’t take any documents with me as there are checkpoints along the way to Kabul. so, this way I tried to reduce the risk. We stayed one night in Kabul and from there, we took a public bus to Herat and once in Herat, we immediately departed to Zaranj. Now, it is two days that we are here and waiting for our Qachaghbar (smuggler) to take us to Iran. The Qachaghbar guaranteed us to cross the border to Iran and if he fails, then we will try again up to three times.”

“It was obvious that if we stayed there, my child would not survive”

Since the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan on 15-August 2021, there has been massive concerns of potential persecution of human rights defenders, ex-soldiers, ex-government employees, journalists, and people belonging to religious, ethnic and other minority groups. Five months on, in eastern Turkham on the border to Pakistan, Asma (name changed) one of thousands attempting to escape from Afghanistan is waiting to cross with her husband and infant child.

“On the day that Taliban took Kabul, I was in the office and working when my colleagues came shouting that Taliban took the city and everyone was running away to their houses. It was a total chaos. People ran in all directions, cars were all stuck on the streets. So, I had to walk all the way to my home, crying. I was working in a governmental office and my husband was an employee working for an institution involved in human rights activities. Everybody knew us as a family who worked for the government and the foreigners. Me and my husband talked about the situation and the possible dangers, and we realised that it is not possible for us to stay in Afghanistan. If we stay, we will be at risk for sure.

We wanted first to go to Iran as my parents are living there. I also grew up as a refugee in Iran years ago and studied there and know the country well. But the embassy was closed and no visa available. We were thinking about Pakistan when the evacuations started. My husband used to work in a project funded a foreign government and was eligible to be evacuated. After a week, someone who was the link between that government

and the team, called us and said that we had to go to the airport and introduce ourselves to the international soldiers from that country. They even gave us a code to pass to the soldiers so they would allow us into the airport. We already saw the news from the airport and heard what was going on there. And we were reluctant to go. Finally, we decided to try and started packing the necessary things.

Once we got to the airport, it was so crowded that you cannot believe it. Thousands of people all crumbling and climbing on each other to reach the gates or walls. And at the same time, Talib soldiers were beating the people with cables. It was so horrifying that my husband immediately took my hand and took us back to home. It was obvious if we stayed there my child would not survive. When the evacuation from the airport stopped, we waited for the Iran or Pakistan Embassy to reopen and to get a visa. After almost a month, the same contact person reached out to us and told us to wait as the foreign government relevant to our case would resume the evacuations from Pakistan. So, we decided to wait till our turn and then go to Pakistan.”

After obtaining a visa to Pakistan, Asma and her husband sold their belongings and left with their baby to Turkham to cross the border.

“My husband’s family is here [Kabul] and because of that, he suffers a lot. He is very attached to them emotionally. I never saw him cry before, but when he was saying goodbye to his father and mother, he cried for 10 minutes. It is not clear if we will see them again, since we know that we cannot come back to Afghanistan in the near future, at least for the next 10-15 years. So, it was really hard to say goodbye to the life we had crea-

ted in Kabul with hard work in all those years. On the way to here, we were very stressed and afraid that Taliban soldiers may stop us along the way and search our backpacks and see the travel documents and letter from German embassy. But fortunately, no one along the way asked us about our travel. Now, tomorrow, let’s see what happens in the border when we want to leave Turkham.”

Not everyone in Asma and her husband’s family had the opportunity to leave

“One of my brothers and his family are still in Kabul. My husband’s whole family are in Kabul, because they have not worked with foreigners and are not included in evacuation programme. They don’t have enough money also to travel to other places. Even if they had money, all the embassies are closed. They have to go to intermediaries which is very costly. Our families are big, my brother has five children, so they are seven people and if they want to pay for Iran visa for seven people, the cost will be very high, and they cannot afford it.

My husband’s mother has been sick for two years. Before Taliban, she would regularly go to hospital for treatment and medicine, but most doctors and nurses are not working. Some have again started operating, but they don’t have enough personnel and the costs for their treatments increases day by day”

Burkina Faso

Country Context

Burkina Faso is an emerging crisis that has been growing since violence escalated in the country in 2019. In 2022, more than 3.5 million people will be in need of humanitarian assistance.³⁵

Following the 2014 uprising in Burkina Faso, which saw the fall of the long-serving Compaoré regime, struggles erupted between the Regiment of Presidential Security (RSP) and the regular military. This culminated in a failed coup in September 2015 followed by presidential elections in November 2015, which brought Roch Marc Christian Kaboré to power. This did little to increase stability in the country, as Compaoré allegedly had outsourced security in Burkina Faso to extremist groups, which now turned on the government. Just a few days after Kaboré was sworn into office, the capital was hit by several terrorist attacks. Violence continued to plague his presidency and in January 2022 he was overthrown in a military coup.

The capacity of the military to counter the threat from the extremist groups has been hampered by internal reorganisation of the military and dismantling of military equipment following the 2015 coup attempt, which has decreased trust in the military. Rather than relying on the military, the government has tried to crack down on the extremist groups by using local self-defence groups or 'Koglweogo', which has created a vicious cycle of retaliatory violence between communities.³⁶ In the absence of state institutions and monopoly on force, these groups become the de facto guarantors of security and in some cases justices for local communities. However, these groups also undermine efforts to build state capacity and become a source of insecurity as they escalate local conflicts. Koglweogo groups have been engaged with countering the presence of extremist groups, but have also come into conflict with the Dozo (traditional hunters and protectors of communities) in the west and the Fulani semi-nomadic herders in the centre and north of the country.³⁷ The Koglweogo and other self-defence groups are also gradually taking on the state's role by engaging in taxation, justice and policing in addition to security – sometimes in tacit agreement with the local authorities.³⁸ This further erodes the state's legitimacy, which is also challenged by the human rights abuses and atrocities being committed by state security forces and the Koglweogo and other self-defence groups as part of their campaign against the extremist groups.³⁹

In January 2020 the government also created the VDP (Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie), which are local militias made up of civilians that the state decided to arm to deal with the terrorist threat. The VDP are mostly former members of self-defence groups who have now obtained the right to carry weapons of war. The Burkinabè army is responsible for the VDP, and in some areas the VDP have managed to defend their villages from attacks by armed terrorist groups. However, the creation of the VDP has also a negative effect: the VDP has stigmatised the Fulani ethnic group by branding the group as terrorists. Moreover, the arming of the VDP reinforces a war economy, where extortion, exactions on civilians and settlements of accounts/gangland killings are common. Also, with the creation of the VDP, armed terrorist groups now see civilians as armed actors, and therefore increasingly target civilians. Civilians thus end up being the targets of uncontrolled VDP and armed terrorist groups.

Violence, which escalated in 2021, now affects more than half the country. While battle episodes have only increased by 25%, violence against civilians has doubled and incidents of explosions or remote violence, such as drone attacks and IEDs have more than quadrupled. In 2020 only 33 drone strikes were recorded, while 257 were recorded in 2021, primarily driven by increased military attack against extremist groups in the country. This has not stymied extremist group activity as they were engaged in almost twice as many conflict episodes in 2021 as in 2020.⁴⁰ Islamic State and other extremist groups continue to launch attacks on civilians in the northern Sahel region, while consolidating their presence in the east and expanding westward.⁴¹ The development has established Burkina Faso as the epicentre of violence in the central Sahel region and the conflict, already tied to violence in Mali and Niger, could spread into other neighbouring states such as Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana.⁴²

35 OCHA (2 December 2021): *Global Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022*

36 IRC (15 December 2020): *2021 Emergency Watchlist*

37 Cristiano Lanzano, Sabine Luning & Alizèta Ouédraogo (September 2021): *Insecurity in Burkina Faso – beyond conflict minerals*, NAI Policy Notes 2021:3

38 International Crisis Group (24 February 2020): *Burkina Faso: Stopping the Spiral of Violence*, Crisis Group Africa Report N°287

39 Human Rights Watch (23 January 2021): *World Report 2021*

40 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED): *acleddata.com*

41 International Crisis Group (November 2021): *CrisisWatch: November alerts and October trends 2021*

42 Internal Displacement Monitoring Center: *Burkina Faso*

There is significant risk that new hotbeds of violence will emerge in the next 1–3 years. Opening of new hotbeds of violence in the west and southwestern regions is anticipated as armed groups are increasingly active in these areas. There is also risk of rising ethnic tension as the activities of extremist groups in Burkina Faso is being ascribed to the Fulani ethnic group. Lastly, tension may also increase between host communities and IDPs, which can spur conflict.

The limited military capacity and presence beyond the capital, which has created legitimacy for the Koglweogo groups is a symptom of the generally weak Burkinabè state, which is plagued by insufficient funds and lack of ability to provide basic services to the population, including health care, water, education and electricity. The inability of the government to respond to the needs of the population, in particular urban and rural youths who led the 2014 protests, has contributed to political disillusionment, which creates the foundation for support for the extremist groups and Koglweogo. While decentralisation efforts have been undertaken to remedy these shortfalls, these efforts have so far failed to deliver.⁴³

To further complicate the challenges faced in Burkina Faso, climate change and environmental degradation is reducing community access to fertile soil, pasture and water. These changes are upsetting the balance between herder and farmer communities as traditional routes of transhumance are transformed, creating the foundation for tension and conflict between the two communities.⁴⁴ The changes in the environment together with conflict are also affecting food security. Agricultural production in some areas decreased by as much as 80% in 2021 because of drought and insecurity limiting the harvest.⁴⁵ As such, food insecurity is expected to worsen: in 2022 the Sahel region is projected to be in Emergency level, while the Nord, Centre-Nord and Est regions are projected to be in Crisis level.⁴⁶

The conflict and abuses facing the civilian population have led to significant displacement in the country. In 2021 an increased number of previously internally displaced Burkinabè sought asylum in neighbouring countries.⁴⁷ More than one-third of IDPs have now been displaced for more than two years and an increasing number now want to integrate in their current host locations rather than return to their places of origin, despite the government's push for their return. IDPs in the country face severe conditions.⁴⁸ As host communities, they are exposed to the conflict and violence plaguing the country, but more than 75% of IDPs also live without adequate shelter. Only 35% of IDPs and host community members believe they are receiving aid that covers their essential needs.⁴⁹ Many IDPs are currently hosted in smaller towns, but it is expected that many newly displaced will start to move to bigger cities because they are feeling increasingly insecure.

43 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (March 2020): *Burkina Faso, Conflict Insight* vol. 1, Addis Ababa University

44 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (March 2020): *Burkina Faso, Conflict Insight* vol. 1, Addis Ababa University

45 OCHA (2 December 2021): *Global Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022*

46 FEWS NET (December 2021): *Food Security Outlook Update: Des augmentations atypiques de prix de denrées de base sur plusieurs marchés du pays.*


47 OCHA (2 December 2021): *Global Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022*

48 Alesia O'Connor & Chloe Sydney (2 November 2021): *Severity of internal displacement – 2021 report*, Internal Displacement Monitoring Center

49 Ground Truth Solutions (25 November 2021): *Indicateurs de perception | Burkina Faso 2021*

Displacement Forecast

Based on developments in Burkina Faso, the Foresight model is predicting that the cumulative number of people living in displacement from Burkina Faso will increase by more than 400,000 in 2022 – a 26% increase in the number of displaced people from Burkina Faso compared to 2021. Displacement is forecasted to continue into 2023, when the number of displaced people is forecasted to increase by an additional 320,000 – a total increase of more than 720,000 in the number of people displaced in 2021 to 2023.



DRC Presence

DRC has six fully operational and established offices in Burkina Faso, covering four of the six regions declared in emergency in 2021. In line with its mandate and commitment to rapid, agile, needs-based action and the vision that every displaced person has a right to dignity, DRC has expanded and adapted its operations and presence in the country. From a small operation focused on providing protection assistance and durable solutions to refugees, the mission has become a major humanitarian response agency, providing assistance and protection to thousands of displaced people in 2019 and 2020.

DRC is working to respond to the most urgent needs, prevent and reduce the risks of protection and conflict and support the populations in the search for early and sustainable solutions. DRC is working on food security and livelihoods through training and apprenticeship in trades in training centres and practical work placements to enhance the employability of youths and to avoid youths being recruited into armed groups. DRC is further working on income-generating activities, village savings and loan associations, and has initiated a three-year graduation approach to monitor and support vulnerable populations to lessen their level of vulnerability.

Protection is at the core of DRC's work in Burkina Faso. In addition to being integrated into the work in other sectors, DRC is also working directly with protection through monitoring of protection risks at individual and community level. Individual assistance activities are carried out in response to protection incidents, risks of incidents and extreme vulnerabilities. The provision of assistance through cash transfers will be assessed and gradually integrated into the range of possible responses. Psychological first aid activities will be stepped up. DRC will also engage in case management with a view to supporting social services, to support them when they lack resources and strengthen the synergy between humanitarian actors and State services in responding to the needs of the population.

Lastly, DRC's core focus is on activities that contribute to social cohesion, strengthen local protection systems, raise awareness of rights and services, and support the green bio-circular economy in order to inform future sustainable solutions. This involves raising awareness, training and bringing together stakeholders to create a space for learning and reflection, on the basis of information collected individually by stakeholders and collectively through joint initiatives to inform a common agenda on early and durable solutions and future durable solutions policies and programmes.

Cameroon

Country Context

In the past decade, Cameroon's reputation as an island of stability in a troubled region has come under pressure as several conflicts have erupted in the country. In the Far North region, Boko Haram (or Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād, JAS), which has been operating since 2013, and later the Islamic State in West Africa (IS-WA) have drawn Cameroon into regional instability around the Lake Chad Basin. In the western part of the country, the 'Anglophone' conflict began in 2016, when a separatist movement emerged in the English-speaking Northwest and Southwest regions following strikes and protest over the dominance of the French language in the education and judicial system.⁵⁰ According to the UN, 4 million people will be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2022.⁵¹

Recently, there has been a shift in the dynamics of the violence in the Far North. This follows the death of Abubakar Shekau, leader of JAS, who was reportedly killed by IS-WA fighters. This has enabled IS-WA to establish itself as the stronger of the two groups and consolidate its power in the region. The killing of Shekau weakened JAS and prompted many former JAS fighters, family members and unaffiliated residents of former JAS-controlled areas to surrender to Nigerian and Cameroonian authorities.⁵² IS-WA is following a different tactic to that followed by JAS and is focusing more on establishing positive relations with the communities and positioning itself as an alternative to the Cameroonian state. As such, IS-WA has also departed from excessive use of force against civilians, which was a common tactic for JAS, and rather appears to be targeting security personnel, military bases and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) coalition troops rather than civilians.⁵³ This shift has contributed to the 34% decrease in episodes of violence against civilians in Cameroon.⁵⁴

The Far North is also plagued by inter-communal rivalries, which are becoming deadlier because of the proliferation of weapons. Current estimates suggest that 120,000 small arms and light weapons are in illegal circulation in Cameroon.⁵⁵ These conflicts are fuelled by changes in the climate, which are creating competition for access to rivers and streams that offer grazing, water and arable land – the foundation of many people's livelihoods in the region. Together with the presence of transnational groups such as JAS and IS-WA, the tension and conflict could worsen regionally because the security issues in the Lake Chad Basin are linked by ethnic, historic and economic ties in the region.⁵⁶

The conflict is playing out within a context of broader ethnic and political tension. The political landscape has become deeply divided since the 2018 election, when several irregularities were documented. Since then, the Cameroon Renaissance Movement led by Maurice Kamto has boycotted parliamentary and regional elections in 2020 and has been a vocal critic of President Biya's handling of the crisis in the Northwest and Southwest.⁵⁷ This political conflict also has an ethnic element because Kamto belongs to the economically influential Bamileke ethnic group, while Biya belongs to the Bulu southern ethnic group. Hate speech, including on social media, has inflamed tension and has raised concerns about the potential for violence along ethno-regional lines.⁵⁸ Further deepening the political conflict, the president has sought to decrease political space by arresting political opponents. State legitimacy and capacity is also being challenged by the inability to secure appropriate service delivery to the population. In the Northwest and Southwest, schools and teachers have been targeted by non-state armed groups. The areas hosting significant number of IDPs (Far North and Southwest) and refugees (Far North and East, which deals with refugees from the CAR) also experience strains on the ability to deliver services.⁵⁹

The ability to provide services has further been hampered by the impact of COVID-19 on the global economy, particularly oil prices. About one in four people in Cameroon live below the international poverty line of \$1.90 per day. Conflict in the country is further hampering agricultural output and rubber cultivation, in particular in the Anglophone regions.⁶⁰

50 ACAPS (19 February 2021): *Cameroon: The education crisis in the Northwest and Southwest regions*, Thematic Report

51 OCHA (2 December 2021): *Global Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022*

52 Tomás F. Husted (22 September 2021): *Cameroon: Key Issues and U.S. Policy*, Congressional Research Service

53 Agha-Nwi Fru & Teniola Tayo (22 July 2021): *ISWAP takes aim at the state in Cameroon*, Institute for Security Studies

54 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED): *acleddata.com*

55 Oluwole Ojewale (26 August 2021): *Cameroon alone can't stop illicit arms flooding into the country*, Institute for Security Studies

56 Remadji Hoinathy & Celestin Delanga (4 October 2021): *Cameroon's community violence adds to Lake Chad Basin security woes*, Institute for Security Studies

57 Arrey Elvis Ntui (12 February 2021): *Cameroon's Ethno-Political Tensions and Facebook Are a Deadly Mix*, International Crisis Group

58 Tomás F. Husted (22 September 2021): *Cameroon: Key Issues and U.S. Policy*, Congressional Research Service

59 IDMC (22 March, 2021): *Out of Sight: Cameroon's Downward Spiral of Violence and Displacement*


60 Tomás F. Husted (22 September 2021): *Cameroon: Key Issues and U.S. Policy*, Congressional Research Service

Furthermore, in the Northwest and Southwest, UN agencies and humanitarian partners had to fully suspend the delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance when non-state armed groups declared a lockdown from 15 September to 2 October 2021. The lockdown left about 170,000 people, mainly in the Northwest region, without any form of assistance because roads, markets and other commercial activities were closed.⁶¹

These trends are causing severe humanitarian need, as are the floods and drought that affect the country, particularly in regions affected by conflict. For IDPs, the situation limits access to health, education and other essential services. Lack of food is another serious concern and more than 900,000 people are expected to be food insecure from June to August 2022, 50% more people than estimates for the same period in 2021.⁶² This is a particular concern in the Northwest and Southwest regions, where households are facing reduced access to their usual sources of food and income because of conflict and drought. Crisis-level food insecurity is therefore expected in the lean season from February to May 2022 as households will have depleted their food stocks and will face higher prices in the markets.⁶³ In order to cope, many households are already adopting irreversible emergency food-based coping strategies, such as selling productive assets. IDPs are also facing significant protection risks, including high rates of sexual and gender-based violence. As such the severity of internal displacement in Nigeria is deemed to be very high.⁶⁴

Displacement Forecast

Based on the developments in Cameroon, the Foresight model is predicting that the cumulative number of people displaced from Cameroon will increase by approximately 300,000 people in 2022. The model predicts that the number of displaced people will increase by 160,000 in 2023, meaning a total increase of more than 450,000 from 2021 to 2023.



DRC Presence

DRC started operations in Cameroon in 2018 responding to the humanitarian needs of refugees from CAR and vulnerable host communities in the Adamawa region, with a focus on protection and economic recovery interventions. Currently, DRC intervenes in the Adamawa and East regions with an integrated approach aiming to improve the individual and community protection environment while providing food security and livelihood support. Activities include individual protection assistance, the creation and training of community-based protection committees, assistance to obtain birth certificates, awareness raising on protection issues, provision of unconditional cash assistance, creation of village savings and loans associations and support for income-generating activities.

61 OCHA (5 November 2021): *Cameroon: Situation report*

62 OCHA (2 December 2021): *Global Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022*

63 FEWS NET (1 December 2021): *Cameroon Key Message Update: Le conflit maintient les ménages en situation de Stress (Phase 2 de l'IPC) malgré les récentes récoltes, novembre 2021*

64 Alesia O'Connor & Chloe Sydney (2 November 2021): *Severity of internal displacement - 2021 report*, Internal Displacement Monitoring Center

DRC expanded its humanitarian activities to the Southwest region in January 2019, and focuses on assisting IDP and their host communities in rural, hard-to-reach areas affected by conflict. DRC responds to the emergency protection, shelter, non-food items (NFIs), and food security needs of vulnerable populations. Activities include individual protection assistance, the creation and training of community-based protection committees, psychosocial support for children and their parents/caregivers, awareness raising, emergency shelters / NFI kits for recently displaced people, and unconditional food assistance through vouchers.

Since the start of the COVID pandemic, DRC has also provided hygiene-awareness sessions and hygiene kits to prevent the spread of the virus.

“When they started shooting and killing people in Esu, we ran to the bush”

In 2019, fighting between the military and opposition armed groups in Esu in Northwest Cameroon led to several civilian deaths and dozens of houses burnt. Several people fled the violence including Roskstana – a 25-year-old woman who lives with her three-year-old son and her grandmother, and takes care of her aunt, who has a mental disability, and her eight-year-old daughter. “When they started shooting and killing people in Esu, we ran to the bush and stayed there for three months. During this period, we thought of relocating to a safer place but we did not know where to go to and did not have the means for transport either.”

While hiding in the bush, Roskstana learned that her house and all her belongings inside had been burnt. She had a few farm products that she managed to sell to have enough money for transport away from

the area. “We packed our things in the morning, neighbours gave us a mattress since I had a baby, then we looked for a motorbike rider and informed him we needed to be transported to Fundong. Then the rider came and carried us. We did not use the main road because it was blocked. However, we managed to reach Fundong on the same day where we found a car that took us to Bamenda, then got another car in the night that took us to the Southwest in Mile 17 Buea, then got a taxi to Tole. Tole is a community where there are many people originating from Esu.

“My uncle stayed behind because he did not know where to go to. His own house was not burnt so he preferred to stay behind amidst gun shots. At the time he thought things were going to get better. He is alive but not having it easy. He does not even have food to eat.”

Being displaced has taken a heavy toll on the family. “I lost my source of income and my grandmother who

was helping me is now depending on me. It is not easy to have access to land for farming. The shock of the burning of our house has affected my grandmother and her body is shaky. Without a source of income, I’m expected to feed five people on a daily basis and pay the rent of the house where we are living.”

Roskstana does not believe the situation in Cameroon will become better soon. “I hope things will change but for now I’m not seeing any improvement when it comes to the crisis. I think there will be an increase in displacement because the crisis is just increasing. There are still people that are being killed, houses still being burnt, gun shots still heard, and we are not hearing of any solution yet. “If things get better and the peace go back in Isu, I will like to go back there and establish a good hair dressing saloon. I will send my child to school and be able to take care of my grandmother.”



Central African Republic

Country Context

The Central African Republic (CAR) is one of the least-developed and poorest countries in the world, ranked second lowest on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index. The country has a longstanding pattern of cycles of instability and has been plagued by political coups, violence and insecurity since gaining independence. Violence flared up in late 2020 and 2021 because of contested national elections. As a result, in 2022, 3.1 million of a population of 4.9 million will need humanitarian assistance.⁶⁵

Despite international stabilisation efforts and multiple peace processes over the past decades, CAR remains plagued by violence. Many parts of the country, particularly the border areas between CAR, Chad and Sudan, have for many years been a hotbed for armed groups that have exploited the lack of state presence and the lucrative economic opportunities arising from mining, illegal taxation and cross-border trade. This has created a vicious cycle as new armed groups have emerged to try to gain control of the lucrative, illegal economy, while citizens have responded to the lack of security and state presence by forming self-defence groups, often along ethnic, religious or regional lines.⁶⁶ In addition to the proliferation of armed groups, the current violence centres around a coalition of armed groups under the leadership of the former president François Bozizé, the national armed forces and their international allies. This conflict has roots going back to 2013, when Bozizé was removed from office by another coalition of armed groups known as Séléka drawn mainly from Muslim communities. Bozizé fled the country, while local self-defence groups and former presidential guards came together to form the Anti-Balaka and counter the Séléka, but the retaliatory nature of the violence led to the ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population in 2014, forcing an estimated 80% out of the country.

Relative calm was restored when Faustin-Archange Touadéra, Bozizé's former prime minister, was elected president in 2016. In 2019, the government signed a peace agreement with 14 armed groups recognised under the Touadéra presidency. Bozizé returned to CAR in 2019, despite facing an international arrest warrant for crimes against humanity and incitement to genocide. After he was barred from running for the presidential elections in December 2020, Bozizé joined six armed groups to form the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) to demand that the elections be postponed and a new round of peace talks initiated. These demands came as a result of CPC dissatisfaction with the implementation of the peace agreement. Violence then escalated, civilians were targeted by CPC attacks and the government accused Bozizé of attempting a coup.⁶⁷

In 2021, President Touadéra was re-elected for a second, five-year term and has since initiated a rapid offensive in which the military (Central African Armed Forces, FACA) regained control of parts of central, eastern, and northern CAR. The increased presence of FACA and the government around the country is a significant shift in the conflict dynamics and could have resulted in increased stability and security.⁶⁸ The increased presence of FACA has been helped by support from the Wagner group. Yet it seems that the changing dynamics have led to a fragmentation and restructuring of the armed groups, which continue to pose a threat to the security and protection of civilians. Rather than eradicating armed groups, the Wagner group also stands accused of perpetrating abuses that increasingly drive violence and fuel counter-insurgency against government troops by rebels scattered in the bush.⁶⁹ Episodes of violence against civilians in CAR increased by more than 80% in 2021 compared to 2020 with a four-fold increase in fatalities. The third quarter of 2021 saw almost three times as many fatalities from violence against civilians than the total number of fatalities in 2020.⁷⁰ Tension has erupted as the increased presence of FACA has disrupted the extraction and illegal trade that the armed groups have profited from. The groups compensate for this loss by increasing taxation and abusing the civilian population.⁷¹ CPC-affiliated groups are further accused of significant violations against and abuse of the civilian population, including forced recruitment of children, attacks on peacekeepers, cases of sexual violence and the looting of humanitarian organisations. FACA and international allies are also accused of abusing the civilian population and there have been cases of excessive use of force, indiscriminate killings, the occupation

65 OCHA (October 2021): *Aperçu des Besoins: République Centrafricaine*

66 Mohamed M Diatta (March 2021): *New approach to peace needed in the Central African Republic*, Institute for Security Studies

67 Elizabeth Murray & Rachel Sullivan (7 January 2021): *Central African Republic's Disputed Elections Exacerbate Rising Tensions*, United States Institute for Peace

68 Alexis Arief (8 July 2021): *Crisis in the Central African Republic*, Congressional Research Service

69 Pauline Bax (3 December 2021): *Russia's Influence in the Central African Republic*, International Crisis Group

70 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED): acleddata.com

71 OCHA (October, 2021): *Aperçu des Besoins: République Centrafricaine*

of schools and looting.⁷² Some of the abuse has come about as a result of the six-month state of emergency declared in January 2021, which led to reinforced and violent controls, murders, attacks on physical integrity, arrests and arbitrary detentions. A total of 537 human rights violations were recorded between January and July 2021, 40% higher than recorded in the same period in 2020.⁷³ As such, the situation in CAR has deteriorated: the number of areas classified as high priority for protection has increased and now host 3.62 million people against 2.38 million in 2020.⁷⁴ The ethnic and religious elements in the violence means that the risk of genocide and violence against marginalised groups is a serious concern.⁷⁵

There is significant risk that already high levels of violence in the country will escalate when CAR holds a new round of elections in 2022, this time to elect mayors, regional councilors and senators. Given the escalation in violence seen in the run-up and aftermath of the 2020 presidential elections, these elections could also spur tension and violence because there will be new administrative divisions for some ethnic communities.⁷⁶ The elections could be an opportunity for the CPC and other armed groups to push for more recognition and to air some of their grievances. A significant risk factor is the role played by Russia and the Wagner group in training and supporting FACA, which the armed groups perceive as a threat.

Conflict and violence in CAR are driven not only by elections and political competition, but also by changes in the climate and environment. Transhumance corridors are likely to become a growing cause of tension and conflict between farmers and herders, as influx of cattle into CAR has intensified in recent years because of poorer access to pastures and water in neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Sudan. Agricultural practices, crop selection and agricultural productivity are all going to be affected by the predicted increase in extreme precipitation, longer periods of drought and rising temperatures, all of which are upsetting the delicate balance between farmers and herders in the country and region at large.⁷⁷ The country has limited capacity to cope with these changes and CAR is ranked as one of the countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.⁷⁸

This vulnerability is in part driven by its lack of readiness and coping capacity because of the poor economic and governance environment in the country. The government has very limited financial capacity to adapt and improve access to services, and the revised 2021 Finance Act projected a 9% decrease in total state resources. The lack of financial resources limits the government's ability to provide social safety for its citizens. Consequently, 3.4 million Central Africans are predicted to be living in extreme poverty in the period 2021–2024.⁷⁹ Food security projections into 2022 suggest that nearly 2.36 million people will experience high levels of acute food insecurity, including around 689,000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) by August 2022.⁸⁰

This underscores the predicament that many IDPs face when leaving their homes to escape ongoing violence. As of 31 November 2021, the total number of IDPs in CAR was estimated at 669,000. A quarter of them live in IDP sites (25%), and the rest (75%) are hosted in families.⁸¹ More than 240,000 people were internally displaced because of the outbreak of violence in mid-December 2020. Many have been hiding in poor conditions in the forest or fields around their villages, and occasionally return to gather supplies and belongings. Others are being hosted in schools, churches or with families.⁸² Generally, IDPs in CAR and Yemen face the most severe conditions globally. Access to water, sanitation and hygiene facilities is limited; for example, only 10% of IDP localities had functional latrines. Food insecurity and malnutrition are also significant concerns.⁸³ Protection concerns abound, including sexual and gender-based violence, unaccompanied and separated children, and forced recruitment. In addition, armed groups are often present in IDP camps.⁸⁴

72 UN Security Council (June 25, 2021): *Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2536 (2020)*

73 OCHA (October 2021): *Aperçu des Besoins: République Centrafricaine*

74 OCHA (October 2021): *Aperçu des Besoins: République Centrafricaine*

75 Rachel Sullivan & Brianna Ferebee (August 16, 2021): *Beyond Fake News: the Central African Republic's Hate Speech Problem*, United States Institute for Peace

76 OCHA (October 2021): *Aperçu des Besoins: République Centrafricaine*

77 OCHA (October 2021): *Aperçu des Besoins: République Centrafricaine*

78 World Bank (28 June 2021): *Climate Risk Profile: Central African Republic*, The World Bank Group

79 UN Security Council (25 June 2021): *Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General*

80 IPC: *Central African Republic: Acute Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Situation September 2021 – August 2022*

81 OCHA (4 November 2021): *Central Africa Republic: Situation Report*


82 ACAPS (19 February 2021): *Central African Republic: Conflict-led displacement resulting from electoral violence*, Briefing Note

83 Alesia O'Connor & Chloe Sydney (2 November 2021): *Severity of internal displacement – 2021 report*, Internal Displacement Monitoring Center

84 ACAPS (19 February 2021): *Central African Republic: Conflict-led displacement resulting from electoral violence*, Briefing Note

Displacement Forecast

Currently, displacement is occurring mainly in the west and central parts of the country, as citizens flee the violence and abuse committed by armed groups when withdrawing from areas coming under attack from FACA. Some displacement also occurs preemptively, ahead of clashes.⁸⁵ Despite the developments in CAR, the Foresight model is predicting that the cumulative number of people displaced from the country will increase by 18,000 in 2022. Although displacement is projected to decrease by 40,000 in 2023, longer term forecasts for 2024 – despite being quite uncertain – suggests an increase in displacement of approximately 600,000, an increase of approximately 50%.



DRC Presence

DRC has been working with displacement- and conflict-affected populations in CAR since 2007. Between 2007 and 2012, DRC implemented a large variety of programmes designed to support communities transitioning from emergency to early recovery, including protection, livelihoods, education and rehabilitation. With the return of armed violence in 2012 and the coup in March 2013, DRC reoriented its activities toward emergency response with a strong focus on protection, and social cohesion and has become a leading non-governmental organisation (NGO) in these sectors.

DRC currently works with displacement-affected, conflict-affected, and returnee populations in the northwestern provinces of Ouham and Ouham-Pendé, along the borders with Cameroon and Chad. Here, DRC works to strengthen protection capacities and develop durable solutions to displacement challenges. DRC also supports economic recovery programming in Bangui, where there is a large population of returnees and IDPs living in extremely precarious conditions, along with at-risk youth faced with significant protection and livelihood concerns.

Ethiopia

Country Context

The humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia emerged in 2020, when conflict erupted in the northern Tigray region of the country. More than 25,9 million people will be in need of humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia in 2022 - the second highest in the world.⁸⁶ Needs are primarily driven by the conflict plaguing the country, but also environmental hazards are creating displacement and high humanitarian needs.

In June 2020, the Ethiopian government decided to postpone elections due to COVID-19 and extended all local governments terms. Opposed to this decision, a regional election was held in Tigray in September, which was considered unconstitutional by the federal government. Following escalating tensions, fighting between the two parties broke out on November 3.⁸⁷ The violence has continued into 2021 with almost twice as many incidents of violence against civilians and almost 3-fold increase in battles in 2021 compared to 2020. Fatalities from these events are furthermore more than double than the number in 2020.⁸⁸ The dynamics of the conflict have been complex, with a multitude of actors involved: the Tigrayan Defense Forces (TDF), composed of TPLF and other allied actors on the one hand, and the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), fighting alongside the Amhara Special Forces (and allied armed groups), as well as the involvement of the Eritrean Defense Force. The trajectory of the conflict shifted significantly in June 2021. Following an increasingly effective insurgency by the TDF, they seized Mekelle, the capital of Tigray region, leading Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to pull the ENDF out of Tigray and declare a unilateral ceasefire. Building on their momentum, the TDF took control of most of Tigray with the exception of Western Tigray, and expanded the conflict into the neighboring states of Amhara and Afar,⁸⁹ while also establishing an alliance with other opposition actors, including anti-government forces in the central region of Oromia. This has contributed to an increase in tensions and fighting between the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and the ENDF, which risks further worsening tensions between the Amhara and Oromo communities. This could deepen rifts between these two groups in the ruling Prosperity Party, which could lead to a breakdown of the central government. Concurrently, conflict remains active in Benishangul-Gumuz, while there have also been small scale flare ups in conflict along the Ethiopia-Sudan border around the al-Fashqa triangle, which could be exacerbated by ongoing tensions over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

At present, neither the TDF nor ENDF appear to be ready to enter into peace negotiations. The TDF took over the towns of Dessie and Kombolcha in November and came within 200 kilometers of Addis Adaba.⁹⁰ The ENDF regained momentum at the end of 2021, mobilizing additional people and groups to join the armed conflict, as well as procuring more military equipment.⁹¹ ENDF managed to push TDF back in a number of areas in Afar and Amhara, followed by a full retreat by TDF into Tigray. Active fighting continues along the border areas with Tigray, and the ENDF has escalated aerial attacks on Tigray with both air strikes and drone attacks. With momentum shifting back and forth, more fighting appears to be the likely short-term scenario which will increase instability and exacerbate the humanitarian emergency in the country.⁹²

Both sides tried in 2020 to control the important supply lines into the landlocked country. In Afar, the TDF sought to take over the crucial land route to Djibouti, which is linking Addis with the port and thus is key in getting supplies into the capitol – however, since late 2021, they have retreated from these positions. Roads into Tigray from Amhara are no longer open due to active fighting along the Amhara-Tigray border, as well as the destruction of bridges over the Tekeze river, which separates central and western Tigray, only some of which have been repaired. In Oromia, the insurgency blocked the main southerly route to Kenya – another key source of supplies into the country.⁹³

The conflict, as well as blockages of access routes, have had disastrous humanitarian consequences as supplies and aid is prevented from reaching people in need. More than 5 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in Tigray, 83 %

⁸⁶ OCHA (December 2, 2021): *Global Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022*

⁸⁷ International Crisis Group (11 February, 2021): *Finding a Path to Peace in Ethiopia's Tigray Region*, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°167

⁸⁸ Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED): acleddata.com

⁸⁹ Ashish Kumar Sen (November 4, 2021): *U.S. Urges Ethiopia to 'Give Peace a Chance'*, United States Institute for Peace

⁹⁰ Maria Gerth-Niculescu & Philip Kleinfeld (November 17, 2021): *Mediators step up Ethiopia ceasefire bid as aid efforts flounder*, New Humanitarian

⁹¹ International Crisis Group (October 26, 2021): *Ethiopia's Civil War: Cutting a Deal to Stop the Bloodshed*, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°175

⁹² International Crisis Group (October 26, 2021): *Ethiopia's Civil War: Cutting a Deal to Stop the Bloodshed*, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°175

⁹³ International Crisis Group (October 26, 2021): *Ethiopia's Civil War: Cutting a Deal to Stop the Bloodshed*, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°175

are food insecure, 40% are suffering from extreme lack of food and 900,000 are estimated to be in famine like conditions.⁹⁴ Civilians are also suffering from the cuts in electricity, telecommunications and banking services, while budget transfers to Tigray have been cut decreasing access to services and salaries for civil servants.⁹⁵ No humanitarian supplies arrived in Tigray, via the Semera-Abala-Mekelle corridor between 14 December 2021 and up until now (January 28). Overall, 1,338 trucks have entered the Tigray since 12 July, which represents less than 10 % of the required supplies needed to meet the humanitarian needs.⁹⁶ All parties in the conflict in Tigray have been found to have committed violations of international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law, some of which may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity according to a joint report by Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and the UN Human Rights Office.⁹⁷ There are reports of ethnic cleansing, hate speech, arbitrary detention and arrests, enforced disappearances and gender-based sexual violence. Ethiopia is ranked 7th in the world with the highest risk of mass killing⁹⁸ in 2021-2022. The underlying statistical model estimates that there is a 7% risk of a new mass killing beginning in Ethiopia in 2022.⁹⁹

The conflict is having a severe negative impact on food security in the country, which is being compounded by environmental factors. The deyr/hageya season (October to December) has seen below-average rainfall for a third consecutive season, and large parts of Southern Ethiopia, in particular parts of Oromia and Somali Region, are severely drought affected, with poor crop performance, deterioration of livestock conditions and productivity, as well as water shortages for human and animal consumption. In 2022, conflict and drought will lead to extremely high food insecurity with the most severe conditions in Northern Ethiopia with Extremely Critical levels of acute malnutrition and likely hunger-related mortality.¹⁰⁰ A recent study has found that an increase of ten days in the year with high temperature (>37 degree Celsius) increases the number of food insecure households, on average, by 3% and that the increase of one food insecure household is correlated with a 3% increase of the likelihood of future conflicts at the local level. The most exposed regions to climate security risks are Afar, Somali and Tigray regions.¹⁰¹ The prominence of food security is highlighted by the fact that a return intention survey conducted among displaced people showed that 95% highlighted that access to food was a condition that needed to be placed before return, while only 64% highlighted safety and security. 99% of the interviewed also highlighted food as their main need.¹⁰²

More than 4,2 million people were internally displaced as of September 2021 including almost 500,000 due to drought and floods.¹⁰³ People displaced by the conflict, drought and frequent flooding generally have limited access to food, appropriate shelter and basic services. Displaced Ethiopians face significant protection risks including sexual and gender-based violence, housing, land and property issues and loss of civil documentation. Children's access to school is interrupted which will have severe both short and long-term consequences.¹⁰⁴

Displacement Forecast

Based on the developments in Ethiopia the Foresight model is predicting that the cumulative number of people displaced from Ethiopia will increase by more than 70,000 in 2022. In 2023, displacement is projected to increase significantly by an additional 877,000 entailing a total increase in displacement of almost 1 million between 2021 and 2023.

While the Foresight model does not predict the direction of the movement, a recent Mixed Migration Centre analysis of the crisis suggest that mass internal displacement, and involuntary immobility, is the most likely result of the crisis. To a much lesser degree, efforts to move beyond neighboring countries is expected to be undertaken by Ethiopians, while this appears more likely for Eritreans and Somalis.¹⁰⁵

94 WFP (January 28, 2022): *Emergency Food Security Assessment: Tigray Region, Ethiopia - January 2022*

95 International Crisis Group (October 26, 2021): *Ethiopia's Civil War: Cutting a Deal to Stop the Bloodshed*, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°175

96 OCHA (January 27, 2022): *Northern Ethiopia – Humanitarian Update*

97 OHCHR (November 3, 2021): *Report of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC)/Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by all Parties*

98 Mass killing is defined as 1,000 or more civilians deliberately killed by armed forces (whether government or non-state), over a period of a year or less, because of their membership in a particular group

99 Early Warning Project (November, 2021): *Countries at Risk of Mass Killing 2021-22*, Simon-Skjoldt Center for the Prevention of Genocide of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum & the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College

100 FEWS Net (October 2021): *Expanding conflict and prolonged drought expected to drive record-level* and extreme need in 2022*


101 CGIAR (October 31, 2021): *Assessing the relationship between climate, food security and conflict in Ethiopia and in the Central American Dry Corridor (CADC)*

102 IOM (September 16, 2021): *Household Level Intention Survey: Tigray Region (July 2021)*

103 IOM (September 24, 2021): *Ethiopia National Displacement Report 9, Round 26: June - July 2021*

104 OCHA (December 2, 2021): *Global Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022*

105 Chris Horwood (26 January, 2021): *Mixed migration consequences of the Tigrayan crisis*, Mixed Migration Centre



DRC Presence

DRC has been present in Ethiopia since 2009 and is present in Addis Ababa, Gambella Region (Gambella and Dimma), Somali Region (Jijiga and Dollo Ado) and Tigray Region (Shire and Mai Tsebri). DRC's country operations include a diverse range of activities across the emergency and development portfolios, including WASH, shelter and NFIs, multipurpose cash, livelihoods, and a range of specialist protection services including SGBV, Child Protection, and Youth Empowerment. As a protection agency, DRC ensures protection is mainstreamed and underpins all programming across its operational areas. With a focus on supporting displaced populations, DRC works with refugees, IDPs, returnees and host communities.

In Addis, DRC manages protection and livelihoods programming to support the wellbeing and resilience of Eritrean refugees, as well as returning migrants. In Gambella, DRC provides shelter, WASH, livelihoods and protection support for South Sudanese refugees, with a particular focus on social cohesion. In Somali Region, DRC works with both IDPs and Somali refugees, providing support for protection, including access to justice and legal aid, livelihoods, including drought response, and durable solutions. In Tigray, before the crisis, most of DRC's work focused on protection and resilience programming for Eritrean refugees in camp settings. Since the onset of the crisis, DRC has re-oriented its programming and is supporting the emergency response, including with protection programmes in the refugee camps (with a particular focus on social cohesion), and for IDPs, NFI distribution and emergency WASH support, including provision of water to IDP sites and hygiene and sanitation services. DRC is also expanding to support emergency risk education efforts. All of DRC's work in Ethiopia aims to enable vulnerable displaced populations to live in dignity and security.

Nigeria

Country Context

Major humanitarian needs and displacement have been affecting Nigeria since 2013. The country is currently going through one of its worst periods of instability, with mounting insurgencies, crime and human rights abuses coupled with economic and environmental challenges. As a result, more than 8.3 million people need humanitarian assistance in 2022 in the Northeast alone.

The humanitarian crisis is driven by a multi-faceted conflict landscape. The north of the country is plagued by armed insurgencies, including JAS (Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād), which is targeting civilians and the military and causing widespread displacement, while the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has targeted the military, Christians, international organisations and government representatives and recently launched a rocket attack at Maiduguri, potentially targeting the airport. In the south, separatist movements are becoming more active, with the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) movement and other groups seeking separation for ethnic Igbo people. Similar developments are seen in the Southwest, where the Oduduwa movement seeks separation for the ethnic Yorubas, while secessionist sentiment is also found in the Niger Delta region and north-central Nigeria.¹⁰⁶ In the northwest of the country, local conflicts between farmers and herders have also escalated in recent years, with kidnappings and ethnic massacres.¹⁰⁷ The North West is also plagued by 'warlordism' – heavily armed criminal gangs that terrorise the rural areas, sweeping into villages, shooting the young men and fleeing with livestock and other valuable assets.¹⁰⁸ As such, episodes of violence against civilians increased by approximately 30% in 2021 compared to 2020, battle episodes increased by approximately 19% and fatalities from these events and explosions increased by more than 26%.¹⁰⁹

The surge in violence and crime in the country has led to a proliferation of ethnic militias, vigilante or community self-defence groups. In the South West, the governors' forum, comprising the six South West states, has established a security outfit called the Amotekun, while the South East has established the Ebube Agu to manage security in the area. This creates a security dilemma for ordinary Nigerians: the absence of strong state institutions creates the need, opportunities and support for local vigilante groups to provide security locally. However, at the same time, these groups, in which little accountability, discipline and oversight exists, undermine the broader security in the country and the development of strong state institutions. The Adamawa State government has tried to curb the influence of these groups and recently banned the operations of the Professional Hunters Association of Nigeria across the state. However, the groups enjoy strong support among the population: research has found that more than 80% agree that "vigilantes make a positive contribution to security in Nigeria".¹¹⁰ There is a growing sense of hopelessness among the population, who realise that the state is unable to enforce a monopoly on force and provide the needed security.

Security forces have been accused of using excessive force to enforce government-imposed COVID-19 mitigation measures. And more broadly, the police continue to arrest, detain, and use excessive force against civilians publicly voicing their grievances.¹¹¹ The 'Lekki toll gate massacre', which led directly to the death of some 12 protesters and allegedly nearly 40 others due to clashes with the police, sparked massive protests against the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) unit of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF). The protests reflect broader frustration with the socio-economic deprivation of youths in Nigeria because of high unemployment, worsening overall economic conditions, increasing poverty, poor quality education, poor healthcare and widespread corruption.¹¹² The underlying economic conditions do not look likely to improve significantly because GDP per capita (constant prices) is likely to remain below 2019 levels into 2026.¹¹³ Support for the vigilante groups should be seen in the light of this growing frustration with the security forces in Nigeria.

106 Oge Onubogu (17 November 2021): *It's Time to End 'Business as Usual' With Nigeria*, United State Institute for Peace

107 International Crisis Group (26 May 2021): *Halting the Deepening Turmoil in Nigeria's North West*

108 Idayat Hassan (8 November 2021): *Nigeria's rampant banditry, and some ideas on how to rein it in*, The New Humanitarian

109 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED): acleddata.com

110 Yagana Bukar, Aly Verjee & Chris Kwaja (8 September 2021): *Six Alternative Ways to Measure Peace in Nigeria*, United States Institute for Peace


111 Human Rights Watch (23 January 2021): *World Report 2021*

112 Osei Baffour Frimpong & Richmond Commodore (September 2021): *#EndSARS Youth Protests in Nigeria: Lessons and Opportunities for Regional Stability*, Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding & Wilson Center

113 IMF (October 2021): *World Economic Outlook – October 2021*

The protests highlight the significant legitimacy challenges faced by the state, which risks further splintering the country and increasing violence. The frustration with state institutions is also visible in the decreasing participation in elections: the participation rate was just 35% in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019. Recent elections in the Anambra state led to significant violence and with general elections scheduled for February 2023, there is a significant risk of further violence given the overall fragility of the situation in the country.¹¹⁴ The feeling of hopelessness is bringing dwindling support for democracy as citizens are vying for a state of security that the civilian state is not providing. At the same time much, the violence is still confined to areas far away from the economic and political hubs of Abuja and Lagos and thus the engagement to improve the situations by elites in the country has been limited. Nigeria is ranked eighth in the world for the risk of mass killing¹¹⁵ in 2021-2022. The underlying statistical model estimates that there is approximately a one in 14 chance of a new mass killing beginning in Nigeria in 2022.¹¹⁶

The high levels of insecurity and violence have led to school closures, as armed groups have targeted schools to block the education of girls, force children into the ranks of the armed groups, provide logistical support in military operations, or abduct students and teachers for ransom. At least 1,409 students have been kidnapped from their schools in Nigeria since March 2020.¹¹⁷ The school closures in themselves create challenges related to early marriage, teenage pregnancies and decreased food security as children miss out on their daily school meals. This feeds into a broader context of a rise in food insecurity as the country is grappling with the impact of COVID-19, which is limiting livelihood opportunities and having an overall negative impact on economic conditions in the country. In December 2021, Lagos state put in place procedures akin to a lockdown to curb the spread of the new Omicron variant and only very few are fully vaccinated. This poses yet another challenge for civil servants as the government has put in place a vaccine mandate for public employees, which means employees have to show proof of vaccination or negative PCR test in order to enter a workplace.



DRC Presence

DRC has had an operational presence in Nigeria since July 2015, including field offices in Mubi, (North Adamawa), Maiduguri (Borno state) and Damaturu (Yobe state) and sub-bases in Bama, Ngala, Pulka and Mafa. The overall response currently focuses on the provision of assistance to conflict-affected IDPs in camp or camp-like settings and among returnees and host communities.

114 Oge Onubogu (17 November 2021): *It's Time to End 'Business as Usual' With Nigeria*, United State Institute for Peace

115 Mass killing is defined as 1,000 or more civilians deliberately killed by armed forces (whether government or non-state), over a period of a year or less, because of their membership in a particular group

116 Early Warning Project (November 2021): *Countries at Risk of Mass Killing 2021-22*, Simon-Skjoldt Center for the Prevention of Genocide of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum & the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College

117 Danish Refugee Council, International Rescue Committee, Norwegian Capacity, Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children, UNICEF, UNESCO, UNHCR, OCHA & WFP (25 October 2021): *Education under Attack in West and Central Africa*, Regional Education in Emergencies Working Group

118 FEWS NET (December 2021): *Conflict in the Northwest drives large-scale displacement disrupting livelihoods and the ongoing harvest*

119 Alesia O'Connor & Chloe Sydney (2 November 2021): *Severity of internal displacement – 2021 report*, Internal Displacement Monitoring Center

120 Amnesty International (15 December 2021): *Nigeria: Plans to close IDP camps in Maiduguri could endanger lives*

DRC is addressing food security via distribution of emergency food assistance (in kind, voucher or cash) and working on protection concerns by providing context-specific, timely protection responses to individual cases, monitoring and reporting protection risks and establishing solid referral mechanisms with relevant service providers and psychosocial assistance. DRC is also engaged in mine-risk education and working towards humanitarian mine action, to raise awareness about unexploded ordnance among IDPs, returnees and host communities to limit risk during displacement and early return together with undertaking non-technical surveys (NTS), thereby identifying mines and hazards and reducing potential hazards and subsequent harm. Furthermore, in 2021 alone, DRC conducted two Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Level 2 training courses for police officers in North East Nigeria – thereby building the capacity of local civilian authorities to respond to reports of explosive remnants of war.

DRC is also working on solutions to displacement by supporting reconstruction of communities destroyed by the conflict, capacity building of duty bearers and advocacy on behalf of IDPs, and is supporting vocational skills training and the development of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to facilitate recovery and stabilisation.

Lastly, DRC is working on addressing the root causes of displacement and conflict in North East Nigeria by mainstreaming conflict sensitivity through programmes, support to dialogue and positive integration between communities and security providers, developing community safety plans, and directly targeting youths to ensure their engagement and empowerment.

“I left with only a pair of clothes”

Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (BAY) states in North East Nigeria are currently facing acute crisis as a result of ongoing military hostilities between the Nigeria army and organised armed groups. Elizabeth lives in Gwoza local government area (LGA), Borno state. She is 58 years old and heads her household of seven dependents (two girls and five boys). She had been displaced for four years, and has now returned to her place of origin, Pulka community of Gwoza LGA.

“I was displaced from Pulka to Cameroon for four years, after Boko Haram infiltrated Pulka looting food items and valuables, setting buildings ablaze, killing civilians including my eldest son and government security forces while holding many hostages. Before the attack, I have never thought of leaving my community, but the threat of being killed or abducted made me leave my community in search of safety in

Cameroon. I started to think about leaving my home one year before I did when the insurgents started gaining control of local government areas such as Bama, Dikwa, Marte and Baga, restricting movement by road to Maiduguri the state capital.

“I didn’t get a chance to adequately prepare to leave because markets were closed, electricity power cables were destroyed, most roads were not safe. We escaped from the community together with my husband and children at night, I left with only a pair of clothes because you will be killed when the AOGs [Armed Opposition Groups] see you moving with any form of luggage. We walked throughout the night without food and water until we got to Minawawo (Cameroon) three days after fleeing from Pulka.

“After I received information from other refugees that government security forces have regained control of Pulka and that IDPs have started settling back in Pulka coupled with

presence of humanitarian organisations, I decided to return to Pulka. My husband stayed behind, he vowed not to come back because his brothers were killed right before his eyes also his house was destroyed despite our poor living condition.

“Our family lost its means of livelihood because I was a farmer [live-stock/crop production], and when our house was targeted, the food stored and the flock of goats/sheep we had were looted before the house was set on fire. I cannot go back to the farm now because it is not safe to do so.”

Somalia

Country Context

Somalia has for decades been one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. In 2022 more than 7.7 million people in Somalia will be in need of humanitarian assistance – up from 5.9 million in 2021.¹²¹ Humanitarian needs and displacement in Somalia are driven by a complex, multi-layered conflict situation combined with weak governance and economic performance, and severe environmental hazards.

Violence and insecurity in Somalia are driven by political struggles, feuds between different clans and competition over natural resources. In April the country faced its most serious challenge to the political system in years, as violence broke out in Mogadishu because of the failure to hold elections and President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed's (Farmaajo's), decision to extend his term. The situation de-escalated when domestic and international pressure led Farmaajo to cede control of the electoral process and associated security arrangements to Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble.¹²² In September 2021 political turmoil re-emerged because of conflict between Farmaajo and Prime Minister Roble, but eased in October when the leaders agreed to focus on accelerating the country's long-delayed electoral cycle. However, the political crisis is far from resolved. Elections for the lower house seats in 2021 were marred by manipulation, vote-rigging, and illegal interference with the process. The opposition is becoming increasingly frustrated and is losing faith in the electoral process. As a result, the opposition has started to mobilise supporters and movement of aligned security forces into the capital. The trajectory appears to be further conflict and disputes over the electoral process and the risk is that a major flare-up will happen in and around the capital.

The political crisis has created room for al-Shabab, an Islamist insurgent group based in Somalia, to take advantage of the turmoil and scale up its activities and attacks in Somalia. Al-Shabab remains the principal security challenge in Somalia, and continues to mount lethal attacks against Western and African Union (AU) forces and civilians in the region.¹²³ Between January and September 2021, Al-Shabab carried out at least 287 attacks in Mogadishu – a 32% increase compared to the same period in 2020 – in an effort to exploit the political crisis and further derail the electoral process.¹²⁴ Generally, Al-Shabab appears to be further consolidating power in the country.

Overall, the number of conflict incidents in Somalia has remained relatively stable, with violence against civilians and aerial bombardments decreasing, while battle episodes increased in 2021 compared to 2020. The number of fatalities from these events has remained stable.¹²⁵ With the political crisis far from resolved and AU forces planning a gradual withdrawal as security duties are transferred to the Somali security forces, further violence and instability are highly likely – given that the AU forces are the main force deterring Al-Shabab and protecting the Somali government.¹²⁶ The political crisis is intertwined with the functioning of the security apparatus in Somalia and a political deadlock or crisis will likely further decrease cohesion in the armed forces.¹²⁷ This will further erode the confidence and legitimacy of the government in the country, as citizens doubt the integrity of security institutions that should be ensuring their safety.¹²⁸

The political crisis at the national level and fight against al-Shabab is not the only driver of violence in Somalia. Inter-clan conflicts continue to erupt – in Galmudug and Hirshabelle, conflicts escalated between November 2020 and September 2021. Climate change plays a critical role in driving these developments as the dwindling of natural resources intensifies clan divisions.¹²⁹ Tension between Somaliland and Puntland over the control of parts of Sanaag and Sool regions is another ongoing conflict and there is an increasing risk of armed hostilities.¹³⁰

Lastly, Somalia could be affected by developments in neighbouring Ethiopia, which until recently has had a significant

121 OCHA (October 2021): *Humanitarian Needs Overview Somalia 2022*

122 Michelle Gavin (15 September 2021): *Somalia's Ongoing Political Crisis Exposes Fundamental Problem for U.S. Policy*, Council on Foreign Relations

123 Claire Felter, Jonathan Masters, & Mohammed Aly Sergie (19 May 2021): *Al-Shabab*, Council on Foreign Relations

124 ACAPS (October 2021): *Global Risk Analysis – October 2021*

125 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED): acleddata.com

126 ACAPS (16 November 2021): *Somalia Food Security*, Briefing note

127 ACAPS (October 2021): *Global Risk Analysis – October 2021*

128 Michelle Gavin (15 September 2021): *Somalia's Ongoing Political Crisis Exposes Fundamental Problem for U.S. Policy*, Council on Foreign Relations

129 OCHA (October 2021): *Humanitarian Needs Overview Somalia 2022*

130 ACAPS (16 November 2021): *Somalia Food Security*, Briefing note

stabilising effect on Somalia. However, with attention drawn elsewhere, Ethiopia's role is diminishing and there is a risk that the conflict in Ethiopia will spill over into Somalia. As a result, Somalia is ranked among the top-14 countries at highest risk of experiencing a mass killing¹³¹ in 2022.¹³²

The likely increase in violence will have a detrimental impact on the already poor situation when it comes to human rights and living conditions for Somalis. The population is often exposed to human rights violations, abuses against civilians, kidnappings, gender-based sexual violence and violent crackdowns on journalists and this will only increase if al-Shabab gains momentum.¹³³ The group is known to force civilians, including women and children, to enter its ranks, and enforces its own harsh interpretation of sharia: prohibiting various types of entertainment, such as movies and music, and punishing suspected adulterers and thieves by stoning and amputation.¹³⁴

The conflict is also hindering the rebuilding of livelihoods and the economy in Somalia and the country remains desperately poor. The political crisis and conflict are diverting focus from the major development challenges: the population have significant difficulties accessing education, employment and health care.¹³⁵ GDP per capita is expected to be lower in 2022 than in 2020 and will remain lower than 2019 up until 2026 according to economic forecasts.¹³⁶ Poverty remains widespread: 70% of Somalis survive on less than \$1.90 a day and given the economic trajectory this is not likely to improve. Unemployment and underemployment are key drivers of the economic predicament facing households, combined with a drop in remittances because of the COVID-19 pandemic.¹³⁷

Climate change is another challenge for Somalia, exacerbating the country's environmental vulnerability and increasing the frequency of flooding and drought: Somalia is now experiencing a severe drought having had three consecutive below-average rainfall seasons. The October to December deyr rains have been delayed, meaning little to no rainfall in most of southern, central, and northeastern Somalia, which has resulted in significant crop and livestock production losses. Cereal crop production is expected to be 50 to 70 % below the 10-year average. Forecasts for the April to June 2022 gu rains also suggest elevated chances of a fourth below-average rainfall season. Pastoralists are already faced with water and pasture shortages, rapidly weakening livestock body conditions, and declining livestock reproduction prospects. Combined with the poor economic situation, households lack the resources to protect their herds, and ensure the appropriate amount of food and water for both their livestock and families.¹³⁸ Despite the drought conditions, Somalia also experienced flooding in 2021 along the Shabelle and Juba rivers, affecting farmland, destroying crops and displacing local populations – leading to significant crop and income losses.¹³⁹

The conflict and environmental challenges are driving humanitarian needs, in particular food insecurity, which is projected to worsen significantly into May 2022, with many households experiencing widening food consumption gaps because of the limited food and income outputs from agriculture. Projections suggest a very high risk of a rapid rise in the number of people facing Crisis and Emergency outcomes into May 2022, especially in southern and central rural livelihood zones and IDP settlements.¹⁴⁰ Humanitarian needs will also be driven by the expected increase in conflict, which continues to displace significant proportions of the population. A DRC assessment in Belet Xaawa district in the Gedo region with the Horn of Africa Peace Network (HAPPEN) from March 2021 showed that newly displaced households had significant humanitarian needs. Nearly all (95%) assessed households reported inadequate access to food, reflecting the impact of drought conditions and limited humanitarian interventions, due to insecurity. The majority (84%) of assessed households reported losing access to one or more income sources in the year before this assessment, suggesting declining economic resilience of households. The majority of the assessed population used to be small-scale farmers back in their homes but

131 Mass killing is defined as 1,000 or more civilians deliberately killed by armed forces (whether government or non-state), over a period of a year or less, because of their membership in a particular group

132 Early Warning Project (November 2021): *Countries at Risk of Mass Killing 2021-22*, Simon-Skjoldt Center for the Prevention of Genocide of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum & the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College

133 Early Warning Project (November 2021): *Countries at Risk of Mass Killing 2021-22*, Simon-Skjoldt Center for the Prevention of Genocide of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum & the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College

134 Claire Felter, Jonathan Masters, & Mohammed Aly Sergie (19 May 2021): *Al-Shabab*, Council on Foreign Relations

135 Michelle Gavin (15 September 2021): *Somalia's Ongoing Political Crisis Exposes Fundamental Problem for U.S. Policy*, Council on Foreign Relations

136 IMF (October 2021): *World Economic Outlook – October 2021*

137 OCHA (October 2021): *Humanitarian Needs Overview Somalia 2022*

138 FEWS Net & FSNAU (31 October 2021): *Somalia Food Security Outlook October 2021 to May 2022*


139 FAO (25 November 2021): *Somalia: Shocks, agricultural livelihoods and food security, Monitoring report, November 2021*

140 FEWS NET (November 2021): *Intensifying drought will likely result in deyr crop failure and livestock losses*

with the recent combination of the compounding shocks such as extensive floods, desert locust infestations, drought and insecurity issues in their home area, they were forced to flee and seek refuge in the camps. They consequently left behind what used to be their livelihood opportunities. Significantly, more than 70% of women and girls in the two camps reported feeling unsafe in the crowded camps. Access to these services is also hindered by other barriers, such as presence of armed actors, frequent roadblocks, poor infrastructure and ineffective local administration.¹⁴¹ Generally, humanitarian access is impeded in many parts of the country. More than 500,000 people live within territory controlled by Al-Shabab and remain largely out of reach for humanitarian partners.¹⁴² Should there be increased attacks aimed at taking control of Mogadishu, a probable scenario will be that vital roads within and to/from the city could be sealed off, further hampering access, which would leave approximately 845,000 IDPs in the city without humanitarian assistance.¹⁴³

Displacement Forecast

Based on the developments in Somalia, the Foresight model is predicting that the cumulative number of people displaced from Somalia will increase by more than 220,000 in 2022. In 2023 displacement is projected to increase by more than 350,000 meaning a total increase in displacement of more than 550,000 people between 2021 and 2023.



DRC Presence

DRC is among the international NGOs with the largest presence in Somalia, with country-wide programming implemented through five main offices in Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Baidoa, Dollow and Bosaso as well as seven sub-offices. DRC is therefore able to respond rapidly and flexibly to recurrent crises and the needs of refugees, IDPs and migrants.

In Somalia, DRC responds to conflicts and disasters across the country with multisector interventions. DRC's emergency interventions include cash and in-kind assistance – or a combination of the two – while protection (i.e. sexual and gender-based violence prevention and response, child protection, case management, protection monitoring, mixed migration programming, human rights capacity-building and provision of comprehensive assistance to IDPs and refugee voluntary returns, etc.) is integrated based on risks and needs analysis, and in coordination with government agencies and other partners.

DRC's Food Security Livelihood focuses on building and rehabilitation of communal assets through paid labour in-cash/voucher programmes. Unconditional vouchers and cash are provided for most vulnerable populations mainly to access food. DRC addresses poverty and livelihood challenges through youth vocational skills training and support to small micro

141 Danish Refugee Council & Horn of Africa Peace Network (HAPPEN) (March 2021): *Joint Rapid Needs Assessment: Belet Xaawo District, Gedo Region, Somalia*

142 OCHA (October 2021): *Humanitarian Needs Overview Somalia 2022*

143 ACAPS (October 2021): *Global Risk Analysis - October 2021*

businesses, targeting households headed by women. DRC has also designed the innovative Village Savings and Loans Association (VSLA) graduation model that mobilises households into savings groups enabling them to access micro-finance to expand their businesses and trades. In addition, DRC supports farmers with agricultural inputs and training for increased agricultural production and food security.

In water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), DRC provides support in water-access improvements, sanitation facilities, and hygiene awareness and promotion. In infrastructure, DRC focuses on shelter and housing interventions including construction of emergency, semi-permanent and permanent shelters and provision of lighting facilities in IDP camps.

Through its durable solutions approaches, DRC has initiated cost-effective housing programmes that provide sustainable solutions for displacement-affected populations, ensuring that physical, material and legal safety are achieved through a combination of protection, livelihoods, and basic needs programming, coupled with an emphasis on governance.

With the aim of contributing to peace and stabilisation in fragile parts of Somalia, DRC implements security & justice projects in line with the Somalia National Development Plan on protecting conflict-affected communities by improving safety, strengthening community resilience, building local capacities and strengthening civilian access to security and justice institutions to improve accountability and collaboration.

To improve accountability and dialogue with beneficiaries, DRC and the Danish Demining Group (DDG) has been managing an innovative SMS communication project in Somalia since 2011. The SMS feedback system allows for communication with recipients of aid in difficult-to-access areas. In 2020, DRC/DDG began using the platform to share COVID-19 prevention measures and information with beneficiaries.

From IDP to elected leader

On 25 October 2021, the semi-autonomous northeastern Somali region of Puntland held its first local democratic polls in more than 52 years. Residents of Qardho, Eyl and Ufeyn of the Puntland region had the opportunity to cast their ballots in the district election council in a bid to elect their representatives.

One of those elected was Muhsin, a 31-year-old father of three girls and one boy. He is an IDP who has been living in the Shabelle IDP camp in Qardho along with approximately 1,580 families. Muhsin's life has always been one of constant displacement because of recurrent droughts and periodical local conflicts in Somalia. He has experienced living in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia as a displaced person. He has witnessed all the difficult circumstances that come with being an IDP. This has given him knowledge of the needs of the IDPs in the city and he successfully ran to be elected as district representative.

"I am delighted to have a voice in Qardho now representing my people. I will prioritise the urgent needs of the internally displaced community here. In fact, they deserve all the rights others have and we should take the necessary steps to improve

their lives," Muhsin says. "As a person coming from the IDP community, I realise the plights of these people. I have similarly suffered with them, and this gives me an ability and platform to fight for their needs as well as advocate for durable solutions."



South Sudan

Country Context

South Sudan has been a fragile country since civil war broke out in 2013. 8.4 million people will need humanitarian assistance in 2022. Displacement continues to affect the country as a result of interconnected conflict, insecurity and weather shocks.¹⁴⁴

There are three distinct, but related conflicts in South Sudan. An overall struggle for political power, a conflict related to displacement and access to land in Equatoria region, and localised conflict and violence, typically due to climatic changes and environmental hazards. What binds the conflicts together is the lack of a legitimate, central, monopoly on force, which leads political, ethnic and regional communities to establish their own security arrangements. This then undermines the establishment of a central unified security establishment and creates the foundations for conflicts to escalate into violence. Weapons are now prolific in South Sudan, with an estimated 9.58 weapons per person – the second highest level in East Africa, behind Somalia.¹⁴⁵

The political conflict in South Sudan erupted in 2013 between the supporters of President Salva Kiir and rebels in the Greater Upper Nile region. A peace agreement in 2018 paved the way for the creation of a unity government in 2020. Some progress has been made on implementing the agreement, including appointment of legislators for the national parliament and the appointment of governors in 10 states.¹⁴⁶ However, there has been progress on security sector reform, in particular the unification of the armed forces. This has been complicated by political tension that risks spilling into armed conflict. In April 2021, tension emerged between Vice President Riek Machar and other leading figures in the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO). A rival faction emerged headed by the First Lieutenant General Simon Gatwech Dual, who tried to replace Machar as head of SPLM/A-IO.¹⁴⁷ This competition led to clashes between troops loyal to the two groups, which has created a significant challenge for the unification of the armed forces.

The lack of progress on unifying the armed forces and reforming the security sector is also fuelling violence in other ways. Former fighters, more than 83,000, have been assembled in military camps awaiting training, as yet delayed because of a lack of finances and political will. As conditions in the camps are not very good, ex-combatants have resorted to weapons smuggling and cattle raiding, which has created tension and conflict in the local communities. In addition, many armed forces and groups remain outside the camps and clash with the supporters and armed groups of political rivals. These developments greatly undermine progress in the transition process.¹⁴⁸

At the same time, 2016 saw the start of conflict in the Equatoria region. This conflict has longer historical roots related to land and displacement in the region, which has generally remained on the sidelines of the political conflict between Kiir and Machar. Despite a ceasefire agreement between the government and the insurgency, fighting continued.¹⁴⁹ Travel restrictions in place because of COVID-19 hindered the restarting of peace negotiations, but in October 2020 the conflict parties recommitted to the ceasefire. The joint monitoring mechanism of the ceasefire due to start in January 2021 has not materialised.¹⁵⁰ The grievances fuelling the conflict in Equatoria are related to land grabbing by ethnic Dinka migrants or displaced people, as well as encroachment by cattle herders from neighbouring Lakes state into the farm lands of Equatoria.

The grievances in Equatoria highlight the climate-conflict nexus in South Sudan. The country is prone to severe flooding and periods of droughts. This affects the pastoralists, who move their livestock into new territories in search of pastures. The pastoralists are typically also responsible for protection of their communities and carrying arms, so when they relocate, the entire community moves with them. Moving to new territories brings them into conflict with the local communities already present. Given that the groups are armed, such tension can quickly spill into violence. For example, in the Mundri and Lainya areas local community militias were mobilised to counter migrating armed Dinka cattle herders.¹⁵¹

144 OCHA (2 December 2021): *Global Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022*

145 Aaron Karp (June 2018): *Estimating Global Civilian-held Firearms Numbers*, Small Arms Survey

146 OCHA (2 December 2021): *Global Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022*

147 Chido Mutangadura (15 September 2021): *Deadly cost of South Sudan's delayed security reforms*, Institute for Security Studies

148 Selam Tadesse Demissie (12 October 2021): *Rising community violence exposes South Sudan's fragile peace deal*, Institute for Security Studies

149 Alan Boswell (April 2021): *Conflict and Crisis in South Sudan's Equatoria*, Special Report NO. 493, United States Institute for Peace (USIP)

150 International Crisis Group (25 February 2021): *South Sudan's Other War: Resolving the Insurgency in Equatoria*, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°169 Juba/Nairobi/Brussels

151 Alan Boswell (April 2021): *Conflict and Crisis in South Sudan's Equatoria*, Special Report NO. 493, United States Institute for Peace (USIP)

Despite the challenges, violence has decreased in South Sudan in 2021 compared to 2020. The number of battle incidents has decreased by around 23% and the number of fatalities has seen a 16% decrease.¹⁵² However, conflict levels are not expected to decrease further in short term and expected continuation of floods in 2022 will lead to new displacement and migration, which could fuel further violence and local conflicts.

Looking further ahead, elections slated for 2023 in South Sudan could threaten the existing peace agreement and reignite conflict in other regions of South Sudan, in addition to the conflict in Equatoria.¹⁵³ Regardless of the outcome of the elections, state legitimacy will be frail. The country is plagued by poor to non-existent public services, tribalism along ethnic or clan lines, and limited accountability for abuses, crimes, etc.¹⁵⁴ There are few livelihood opportunities for youths, who, as a result, are at particular risk of voluntary or forced recruitment into government militias or armed opposition groups.¹⁵⁵ Such ongoing recruitment can further hinder the progress on the badly needed reform of the country's security sector. The limited opportunities for youths further drive migration to urban areas, where they seek better access to livelihood opportunities. This puts further strain on already limited public services and can cause local tension.

Conflict and poor governance are not the only drivers of displacement and humanitarian needs. The country is also faced with significant flooding, which in the past three years has affected many parts of the country. Since May 2021 alone, an estimated 800,000 people have been affected by floods. The floods are eroding people's livelihoods as livestock is being decimated and crops submerged.¹⁵⁶ The floods, combined with conflict and competition over farmland and water, have hampered agriculture production, destroyed production assets and increased vulnerabilities.¹⁵⁷ Above normal rain is forecasted to continue into 2022, which will result in further flooding and displacement.¹⁵⁸

IDPs are particularly exposed to food insecurity and the many IDPs unable to live in Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites are facing very severe conditions. IDPs have limited access to livelihood opportunities and many have to adopt negative coping mechanisms such as forced labour and child marriage.¹⁵⁹ For displaced and non-displaced South Sudanese there are significant protection concerns, including abductions and conflict-related sexual violence. There are multiple reports of rape of young women and girls by men in uniform and in civilian clothing, with family members forced to witness the incidents. There is also evidence that the violence often targets civilians based on ethnicity and gender.¹⁶⁰ South Sudan is ranked 16th for the highest risk of mass killing¹⁶¹ in 2021–2022. The underlying statistical model estimates that there is a 5% risk of a new mass killing beginning in South Sudan in 2022, in addition to the ongoing mass killings by state security forces targeting noncombatant civilians suspected to be rebel supporters and Machar supporters (SPLM in opposition, Nuers and others) targeting noncombatant civilians perceived to support the government.¹⁶²

Displacement Forecast

Based on the developments in South Sudan, the Foresight model is predicting that the cumulative number of people displaced from South Sudan will increase by almost 250,000 in 2022. The model also forecasts that an additional 350,000 will be displaced in 2023, meaning a total increase in displacement of almost 600,000 people between 2021 and 2023.

152 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED): acleddata.com

153 International Crisis Group (10 February 2021): *Toward a Viable Future for South Sudan*, Africa Report N°300

154 Matthew Pritchard & Aly Verjee (1 March 2021): *South Sudan: From 10 States to 32 States and Back Again*. United States Institute for Peace (USIP)

155 Abraham Diing, Bul Kunjok Majuch, Catherine Night, Chirriilo Madut Anei, Elizabeth Abuk, Elizabeth Nyibol Malou, James Gatkuoth Mut, Joseph Diing Majok, Machot Amuom Malou, Marv Koop, Mawal Marko Gatkuoth, Naomi Pendle, Nicki Kindersley, Nyakuuy Riak Zechariah and Ohide Johnson (15 June 2021): *South Sudan: Youth, violence and livelihoods*, Rift Valley Institute

156 OCHA (2 December 2021): *Global Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022*

157 FAO & WFP (13 May 2021): *2020 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) to the Republic of South Sudan*, Special Report


158 OCHA (2 December 2021): *Global Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022*

159 Alesia O'Connor & Chloe Sydney (2 November 2021): *Severity of internal displacement – 2021 report*, Internal Displacement Monitoring Center

160 OCHA (2 December 2021): *Global Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022*

161 Mass killing is defined as 1,000 or more civilians deliberately killed by armed forces (whether government or non-state), over a period of a year or less, because of their membership in a particular group

162 Early Warning Project (November 2021): *Countries at Risk of Mass Killing 2021-22*, Simon-Skjoldt Center for the Prevention of Genocide of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum & the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College



DRC Presence

DRC is working in South Sudan with the objective of reducing acute humanitarian needs, improving the protective environment for emergency-affected populations, strengthening resilience, and reducing displacement risk. DRC's work is further focused on ensuring more access to durable solutions to displacement, including return, relocation or local integration. Lastly, the work is guided by the objective of supporting men, women, boys and girls to live in a more peaceful, inclusive and resilient society and to reduce the root causes of displacement.

DRC is implementing integrated multi-sector programmes, with a core focus on camp management, protection, gender-based violence, conflict sensitivity, peace-building, food security and livelihoods. Other sectors are also covered based on needs and focus in the given areas. Activities include providing basic services to displacement-affected populations, including protection services, provision of shelter and non-food items, food security and camp coordination/management. In famine- and conflict-affected areas across the country, DRC is deploying mobile response teams (MRTs) to provide life-saving, multi-sectoral responses, including WASH, camp coordination and camp management (CCCM), shelter/non-food items (SNFIs), protection and gender-based violence services.

Yemen

Country Context

Yemen is one of the world's largest humanitarian crises. In 2022, more than 20 million people in the country will be in need of humanitarian assistance.¹⁶³ The humanitarian crisis and displacement are driven by conflict that has been ongoing for seven years and continues to cause significant civilian casualties, the displacement of millions of people and the destruction of the economy and essential services such as healthcare and public institutions.¹⁶⁴

The conflict in Yemen is a longstanding, complex situation with multiple local actors, as well as engagement by a number of regional powers. In the south, the internationally recognised The Hadi-government (the Internationally Recognised Government, IRG) is backed by the Saudi-led coalition, while the Southern Transitional Council (STC) is backed by the UAE. Ansah Allah (AA) in the north are widely believed to be backed by Iran and have control of most of the northern part of the country, where around 80% of the Yemeni population live, which includes the capital, Sana'a.

Conflict has continued unabated in 2021, albeit at an overall slower pace than in 2020 with fewer conflict incidents. However, there was an uptick in aerial bombardments and fatalities in the last three months of 2021 and overall fatalities increased by 35%.¹⁶⁵ Recently, AA forces have been able to consolidate their control of the strategically located governorate of Al-Bayda in central Yemen. The control of Al-Bayda enables AA forces to attack the neighboring oil- and gas-rich Marib governorate on several fronts. Taking Marib would give AA forces access to significant natural resources and would give the AA unchallenged political and military control of northern Yemen. From here, they would likely push towards gaining control of southern governorates to expand their territorial control and to secure access to relevant ports in Aden and Hodeidah. However, such advances would probably not mark the endgame of the conflict, but rather transition into an even more bloody conflict in the country. The battle for the city of Marib may be indicative of this. Despite missile and drone strikes against authorities in Marib, local forces have put up fierce resistance, and there is a high risk that the fighting will escalate. Should the AA seek to make further gains further south, they are likely to meet strong, armed resistance from local armed groups. This seems to be the trajectory of the conflict going into 2022.¹⁶⁶ With escalating conflict, there is a significant risk that more armed groups will emerge, which will further splinter the conflict and make a peaceful resolution more challenging.¹⁶⁷ Such armed resistance is likely to be mobilised along sectarian and religious lines, further destroying the social fabric of the country.

This underscores the fact that it is difficult to speak of a single conflict in Yemen. The situation is characterised by multiple distinct war zones, multiple actors and each governorate has its own characterised conflict dynamics. While most international attention focuses on the overall conflict between the north and south of Yemen, it is important to highlight the myriad of other conflicts fuelled by historical grievances, the hardship brought about by the national-level conflict and the economic opportunities afforded to citizens by joining a militia. In 2021, more than 100 militias were engaged in conflict episodes around the country. Even if progress is made to resolve the conflict between forces in the north and south of Yemen, this would not solve the numerous local conflicts, nor lead to disarmament of the local militias or armed groups. An example of such complexity is Taiz governorate, which has been heavily affected by the fighting between AA forces and the IRG. But while being heavily affected by the national-level power struggle, local conflicts also abound. A recent conflict analysis in Taiz found that conflict over power was reported by less than 20% of respondents, whereas the main sources of conflict were land, water or family disputes.¹⁶⁸

As such, it appears likely that civilian suffering and casualties will continue to rise in the future. So far, more than 233,000 Yemenis are estimated to have been killed as a result of fighting and humanitarian crisis. A recent vote in the UN Human Rights Council ended with the mandate of the Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen (GEE) not being renewed. This means that there will be no independent, global monitoring of the violations by all parties in the conflict and those violating the rights of the Yemeni people will be able to act with a higher degree of impunity and unaccountability. This will only serve to

163 OCHA (2 December 2021): *Global Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022*

164 OCHA (October 2021): *Yemen: 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan Periodic Monitoring Report, January–June 2021*

165 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED): acleddata.com

166 International Crisis Group (14 October 2021): *After al-Bayda, the Beginning of the Endgame for Northern Yemen?*, Crisis Group Middle East Briefing N°84, New York/Brussels

167 Gregory D. Johnsen (25 March 2021): *The end of Yemen*, Brookings's Institute

168 Insight Source Center (ISC) in collaboration with Transition International (TI) (29 September 2021): *Peace and Conflict Assessment in Selected Districts of Aden, Lahj and Taiz Governorate*, Care International

further endanger the lives of many vulnerable Yemenis.¹⁶⁹ Yemen is ranked among the top three countries in the world for highest risk of mass killing¹⁷⁰ in 2021-2022, only surpassed by India and Pakistan. The underlying statistical model estimates that there is a 12.4%, or approximately one in eight, chance of a new mass killing beginning in Yemen in 2021 or 2022. The risk is high because of the high number of battle-related deaths, political killings, high infant-mortality rate and lack of freedom of movement.¹⁷¹

The conflict is having a direct impact on civilians' security and their livelihoods. During the past six years of conflict, Yemen's economy has shrunk by more than half. Approximately 80% of the population now live below the poverty line. GDP per capita (PPP, constant prices) is forecasted to decline in 2022 and remain below 2019 levels into 2026.¹⁷² Because of the conflict and blockade of ports, only limited amounts of fuel is making it into the country. For example, from early May 2021 no fuel was unloaded at the Hodeida port in 11 out of 17 weeks. Instead, fuel was unloaded at the ports of Aden and Mukalla, controlled by the IRG and transported via land to AA-controlled Northern Yemen. This leads to double taxation as both the IRG and AA tax the fuel. Fuel becomes very expensive, as do the prices of other goods that need to be transported; for example, the price of food and water increases significantly.¹⁷³ These prices are further driven up by devaluation of the Yemeni rial, which dropped by 34% in the first half of 2021, which increases the cost of imported goods. The average Minimum Food Basket cost increased by around 23% from January to June 2021 at the national level and was 62% higher in August 2021 than in August 2020.¹⁷⁴ Another development that is affecting livelihoods is the fact that exchange and transfer companies impose large fees – up to 40% – on remittance transfers from southern to northern governorates. This at the same time as a general decrease in remittances from abroad of almost 70% because of the pandemic.¹⁷⁵

The conflict and economic hardship are fuelling anger amongst the population, which has led to a noticeable rise in protests and riots. Protesters have voiced their discontent with the failure of the government to pay public-sector salaries and the deteriorating living conditions as a result of fuel shortages, electricity cuts, rising prices, corruption, crime, insecurity and violence. In some cities there have been calls for the IRG president to step down. In particular, in the third quarter of 2021, southern parts of Yemen saw a surge in civil unrest. In some cases, security forces used live fire to disperse protestors resulting in more than 17 casualties – the highest number of protest-related casualties since 2018.¹⁷⁶ The absence of strong institutions in the country means that there are limited support and social protection of the population to manage the current crisis, resulting in families resorting to various negative coping mechanisms. There has been an increase in road insecurity, which is suggested could be a result of such negative coping mechanisms as people are resorting to crime to gain resources.¹⁷⁷ In addition, the different parties in the conflict stand accused of widespread human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, forcible disappearance, and ill-treatment and torture in detention facilities.¹⁷⁸

Critical infrastructure such as civilian houses, roads, education and health facilities have been destroyed by shelling and bombs. Torrential rain and flash floods also cause significant damage to public infrastructure: between July and August 2021 around 10,000 houses, as well as bridges were destroyed, affecting more than 174,000 people across Yemen. The heavy toll of the conflict on infrastructure and resources of the population means that the impact of heavy rain and recurring floods is increasing.¹⁷⁹

The destruction of housing and infrastructure is driving civilians from their homes. In 2020, more than 220,000 people were displaced because of natural disasters alone.¹⁸⁰ The destruction means that many are unable to return and forced into long-term displacement, typically involving secondary and tertiary movement and limited access to livelihoods opportunities

169 Action Contre La Faim, Danish Refugee Council, Handicap International - Humanity & Inclusion, International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam, Polish Humanitarian Action, Première Urgence Internationale, Save the Children (8 October 2021): *Aid agencies: An end to independent monitoring of the conflict in Yemen puts millions of lives at additional risk*

170 Mass killing is defined as 1,000 or more civilians deliberately killed by armed forces (whether government or non-state), over a period of a year or less, because of their membership in a particular group

171 Early Warning Project (November 2021): *Countries at Risk of Mass Killing 2021-22*, Simon-Skjoldt Center for the Prevention of Genocide of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum & the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College

172 IMF (October 2021): *World Economic Outlook – October 2021*

173 Annelle R. Sheline & Bruce Riedel (16 September 2021): *Biden's broken promise on Yemen*, Brookings Institute

174 OCHA (October 2021): *Yemen: 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan Periodic Monitoring Report, January–June 2021*

175 CARE, Danish Refugee Council, Emergency, Handicap International - Humanity & Inclusion, International Medical Corps, International Rescue Committee, INTERSOS, Mercy Corps, Norwegian Refugee Council, NYC Medics, Oxfam, Qatar Charity, Relief International, Save the Children, Search for Common Ground, Solidarités international (14 September 2021): *INGO briefing for the UNGA: The humanitarian situation in Yemen after seven years of conflict*

176 Civilian Impact Monitoring Project Yemen: *CIMP Quarterly Report Q3: July–September 2021*

177 ACAPS (5 November 2021): *Yemen: Social impact monitoring report: July–September 2021*,

178 Human Rights Watch (12 September 2021): *Yemen: Key Human Rights Concerns for UN Envoy*

179 ACAPS (5 November 2021): *Yemen: Social impact monitoring report: July–September 2021*,

180 Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) (20 May 2021): *Global Report on Internal Displacement 2021*

and support. The lasting damage to critical infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools, businesses, power plants and water infrastructure, will remain a barrier to return for Yemenis.¹⁸¹


At the end of 2021, conflict and violence had led to an estimated 3.8 million IDPs in the country, slightly more than one in four of whom live in informal settlements with limited access to basic services or support from humanitarian actors. Almost half of sites hosting IDPs are within five kilometres of areas with active hostilities, land mines and explosive remnants of war. This means that severity of internal displacement in Yemen is the worst in the world, alongside levels in Central Africa Republic.¹⁸²

The conflict is having a severe impact on humanitarian needs. Food insecurity and malnutrition are the main drivers behind the number of people in need. 48% of households in IRG-controlled areas and 39% of households in AA-controlled areas have crisis-level food consumption.¹⁸³ Widespread crisis food-security outcomes are likely to continue into May 2022, even in the presence of large-scale food assistance, with worst-affected households likely to face Emergency or Catastrophe outcomes.¹⁸⁴ Furthermore, there are significant protection concerns for civilians, in particular women and children, who continue to face serious risks to their safety and well-being. Boys are at high risk of child labour and forced recruitment by non-state armed groups, while women and girls are subject to various forms of sexual and gender-based violence, child marriage and exploitation.

Displacement Forecast

The risk of displacement shows no sign of abating. There are around 1.5 million IDPs and 500,000 host community members in Marib alone. If AA forces capture Marib city, this could cause massive (secondary) displacement.¹⁸⁵ However, there are opportunities for breaking this negative trajectory by engaging in broader, bottom-up conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts to secure sustainable and just peace.¹⁸⁶

Based on the developments in Yemen, the Foresight model is predicting that the cumulative number of people displaced from Yemen will increase by 39,000 in 2022. In 2023 displacement is projected to increase significantly, by more than 300,000, meaning a total increase in displacement of more than 350,000 people between 2021 and 2023. This does not take into account secondary displacement.



181 CARE, Danish Refugee Council, Emergency, Handicap International - Humanity & Inclusion, International Medical Corps, International Rescue Committee, INTERSOS, Mercy Corps, Norwegian Refugee Council, NYC Medics, Oxfam, Qatar Charity, Relief International, Save the Children, Search for Common Ground, Solidarités international (14 September 2021): *INGO briefing for the UNGA: The humanitarian situation in Yemen after seven years of conflict*

182 Alesia O'Connor & Chloe Sydney (2 November 2021): *Severity of internal displacement – 2021 report*, Internal Displacement Monitoring Center

183 World Food Programme (WFP) (November 2021): *Yemen Food Security Update – November 2021*

184 FEWS NET (December 2021): *Food prices decline in IRG-controlled areas alongside recovery of the local currency*

185 CARE, Danish Refugee Council, Emergency, Handicap International - Humanity & Inclusion, International Medical Corps, International Rescue Committee, INTERSOS, Mercy Corps, Norwegian Refugee Council, NYC Medics, Oxfam, Qatar Charity, Relief International, Save the Children, Search for Common Ground, Solidarités international (14 September 2021): *INGO briefing for the UNGA: The humanitarian situation in Yemen after seven years of conflict*

186 European Institute of Peace (December 2021): *Pathways for Reconciliation in Yemen*

DRC Presence

With seven field offices around the country and 450 staff, DRC is one of the largest international NGOs operating in Yemen. DRC began operations in Aden in 2008, focusing on the needs and protection concerns of migrants arriving from East Africa. The outbreak of civil conflict in 2015 required an expansion of that focus, and today DRC works in Yemen to save lives and empower displaced people and migrants to build a better future.

DRC's main programmatic objectives in Yemen are providing immediate and life-sustaining assistance, strengthening the protective environment, and reducing displacement-related risks and vulnerabilities by promoting self-reliance at both the household and community levels. To that end, DRC's activities in Yemen include emergency response, protection services, camp coordination and camp management (CCCM), economic recovery programming, WASH, shelter and NFIs, and humanitarian mine action.

“I left behind everything I know and own”

At the end of 2021, conflict and violence had led to an estimated 3.8 million IDPs in the country, slightly more than one in four of whom live in informal settlements with limited access to basic services or support from humanitarian actors. Almost half of sites hosting IDPs are within five kilometres of areas with active hostilities, land mines and explosive remnants of war. This means that severity of internal displacement in Yemen is the worst in the world. Yahya, a mother of thirteen children has been living as an IDP since 2018.

“We were forced to leave our home due to the ongoing conflict near our village. We had to travel for a whole day on foot to Al Saad area in Maid Al Onaisi Farm, where my family and I have been displaced since June 2018.

We faced a lot of challenges on our way to our displacement destination, there were no transportation means and the few that were available were demanding a lot of money (180,000 Yemeni rials equal to approximately 150 USD). Due to the high risk from landmines and clashes, most drivers refused to come near our area. Some people we knew who were also fleeing the area were in a landmine explosion.”

Living as an IDP is very difficult and the humanitarian assistance provided is not enough to cover the needs.

“The most difficult thing about being

displaced is facing the challenges and being away from home leaving our belongings behind. When we first got to the displacement site, I was feeling upset, I left behind everything I know and own. The site was empty and we had nothing and had to sleep under the trees in the open. We then cut down some trees and began building a shelter.

Now things are much better. We received a lot of assistance including shelters, a latrine, food and other basic needs. The challenges we face now is providing our daily need of food. We used to receive food assistance but now the quantity has decreased and we do not receive it as regularly as we used to in the past. When you are a family of fifteen, it is difficult to survive on the current humanitarian food assistance.

For the future, I wish for peace and safety so that I can go back home. If there was no war, I would be home making a living. The tents we live in are temporary and they are falling apart.”

Mohammed is a student and like Yahya also living as an IDP since 2018.

“I had to leave my home because of the random clashes and shooting on civilian homes. I felt so sad having to leave my home, family and friends behind. The situation back home was very tragic, I fled with one of my friends on a pickup truck that charged us a huge amount of money (150,000 rials).

The journey was tiresome and we were exposed to the hot burning sun

and dust throughout the trip and not to mention the dangers of running over landmines on both sides of the dirt road. I was not able to take anything with me but the clothes on my back because the pickup truck I was in was packed with the elderly, women and little children. There was barely a place for me too.


The biggest challenge I faced was my arrival to the displacement site here on the west coast. It was still under construction, there were no latrines, no wash facilities, and no basic services. I was shocked to see the place and wanted to return home but that was impossible. I now have a transitional shelter which saves my privacy and makes me feel safe. I have also received some cash assistance. One of the biggest challenges I am currently facing is finding means of living. There isn't much work around here.

I wish I could go home. If there was peace and means of living, I wouldn't hesitate to go home. The fighting back home is still escalating and I don't think there is any hope or me to return anytime soon. My hopes and dreams for the future are to find dignified work and move out of the displacement site to my own home. I also wish for peace for my country, for every person suffering from the conflict and I wish for more support for the IDPs who are living in the displacement sites.”

Displacement DNA and its Predictors

As highlighted in the specific country chapters, displacement arises from a complex interplay of a number of factors that can differ from country to country. While the analysis focuses on macro-level drivers of displacement, it is important to emphasise that people have agency: they decide whether to flee or not by evaluating how the different factors pose a risk to their safety, assets and well-being. Therefore, two equal situations do not always lead to the same level/scale of displacement.¹⁸⁷ Deciding to leave is seldom the first option people resort to when faced with an unstable situation. Many live in chronically unstable areas for long periods of time without deciding to flee. People adapt and build resilience to cope with a multitude of political, ecological, economic and social challenges. So, while we focus on displacement in this report, it is important to bear in mind that many more people never leave the unstable areas – either because they are unwilling to flee or because they are unable to flee.¹⁸⁸

To better understand the complex network of factors leading to displacement, DRC and IBM have developed a Bayesian network analysis. The network was initially developed through expert interviews and workshops and after this validated based on 25 years of historical data from 28 countries that all have a history of displacement. The network and links between the key elements will be discussed in more detail below.



187 Bradley, Miriam (2017): *The Impact of Armed Conflict on Displacement*. 10.13140/RG.2.2.33905.94562/1.

188 Clionadh Raleigh (2011): *The search for safety: The effects of conflict, poverty and ecological influences on migration in the developing world*, *Global Environmental Change*, Volume 21, Supplement 1, Pages S82-S93, ISSN 0959-3780, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.08.008>

The network analysis allows us to understand how the complex network that drives displacement works and how the factors interrelate to create displacement risk. However, the model cannot be used directly to predict displacement as the relationships established are for the same year. To allow for this, a sensitivity analysis has been conducted of 25 of the key variables in the Foresight model. This analysis gives an indication of the variables that are most influential in predicting the displacement for the coming year. We have investigated the indicators of highest predictive importance by finding those with highest relative influence¹⁸⁹ in a global model covering all the 26 countries in the years 2006–2020¹⁹⁰. The indicators with the highest relative influence account for the highest reduction in the model's accuracy, when included in the model. If all of the 50 inputs (25 indicators + their change over previous year) were equal in relative influence, they would have a relative influence of 2%. The results from the model show that the indicators have far from equal relative influence and much more skewed towards a few indicators.

It is important to note that displacement is not only complex in that it is driven by a multitude of factors which can differ in the relative importance from context to context, but it is also dynamic in that the role each of these factors play can differ at different stages of a crises situation. The sensitivity analysis and network analysis are thus a general understanding of the role the different variables play overall over the course of a displacement crises. A recent study contributes to the understanding of the dynamic aspect by investigating predictors of monthly asylum claims by Syrians in Germany changed over the course of 2017 to 2019. In the beginning of the period governance aspects in Syria were important predictors of asylum claims, while these played less of a role by the end of the period, where economic aspects in Syria played a more important role. These findings underline that it is important to both understand how the factors interact to create displacement, but also how they evolve over time during a crisis.¹⁹¹

In the network analysis finds that one of the key drivers in displacement is the **human rights** situation. This is not surprising given that one of the criteria for obtaining refugee status is persecution – the severe abuse and denial of the human rights of individuals or groups. In Afghanistan, there are major concerns about the protection of a number of groups, including ethnic and religious minority groups, human rights defenders, ex-government employees, journalist, etc. and many people from these groups could flee as a consequence. As also highlighted in the country chapters, rampant human rights abuses are of concern in CAR, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia and Yemen. Therefore, the human rights situation has a direct impact on forced displacement: the network analysis shows that when a country is in the worst quartile for human rights, in 47% of the cases more than 7% of the population in that country will be displaced. A study has similarly found that the Political Terror Scale – a measurement of a country's violation of international human rights standards – was the key variable in explaining asylum applications in the EU.¹⁹² The sensitivity analysis finds that the human rights score has a relative influence of 5.6% when it comes to predicting the coming year's displacement and is ranked seventh among the 50 variables tested.

The results from the network analysis also show a clear link between human rights and violence. When a country is in the worst quartile for human rights, in 55% of the cases that country will experience more than 800 civilian fatalities per year. Human rights are a driver of conflict and violence in a number of ways, which traditionally has been explained by grievance theory: government violation of citizens' basic human rights creates frustration and anger, which can lead to aggression and violence. A recent study has shown that countries that respect human rights experience 37% fewer violent protests, 79% fewer terrorist attacks, and 86% fewer civil-war deaths on average. It is in particular violation of physical rights (protections from extrajudicial killing, disappearance, torture, and arbitrary/political detention) that can lead to violence and conflict. Governments who kill their citizens are at greater risk of facing violent protests and civil war. Respect for women's rights is also important as this results in a lower risk of violent protests and terrorist attacks, both of which can lead to civil war. A country that does not respect women's rights is predicted to experience around 17 terrorist attacks per year, while a country that fully respects women's rights is predicted to experience only two attacks.¹⁹³ The relationship between violence and human rights also goes the other way, as seen in a number of the country cases, in that when countries are experiencing instability, human rights often become collateral damage, as security attacks violate basic human rights and other rights, such as freedom of the press, free speech and right to assembly.

189 Breiman, L. Random Forests. *Machine Learning* 45, 5–32 (2001). <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010933404324>

190 Except for South Sudan, where data is only available since 2011. This interval was chosen to be able to get the most complete dataset as possible without having to impute missing data points. To combine across countries, select variables, such as number of conflict events or fatalities, have been adjusted per population. The full list of variables is in the section on the Foresight model.

191 Carammia, M., Iacus, S.M. & Wilkin, T. (2022): *Forecasting asylum-related migration flows with machine learning and data at scale*. *Sci Rep* 12, 1457. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-05241-8>

192 Alessandra Conte & Silvia Migali (2019): The role of conflict and organized violence in international forced migration, *Demographic Research*, Volume 41, Article 14, 393–424

193 Cingranelli, David, Skip Mark, Mark Gibney, Peter Haschke, Reed Wood, & Daniel Aron (2019): Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict, *Social Sciences*, 8, no. 2:41. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8020041>

There are important nuances in understanding the relationship between **violence** and displacement. The network analysis shows that when a country has more than 800 civilian fatalities, in 31% of the cases more than 7% of the population will be displaced in that country. If the country has more than 1,500 battle-related deaths, in 22% of the cases more than 7% of the population in that country will be displaced. This is clearly the case in countries such as Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and CAR, where a significant increase in violence is a leading cause of displacement. One study has found that the spread of violence, and in particular whether it targets urban areas, is more important in determining displacement.¹⁹⁴ Civil war on average affects approximately 48% of a country's territory, but the average amount of territory with repeated fighting is 15%. This is important in shaping the opportunities for civilians to find safe havens.¹⁹⁵ Another study has shown that the higher the severity of lethal events in the country of origin, the higher the number of asylum seekers to the EU.¹⁹⁶ This is also corroborated by another recent study that analyses the elasticities between conflict deaths and refugee outflow. Within-country analysis finds that a doubling of conflict deaths will lead to a 42% increase in refugee outflow on average that year. Analysing the relationship across rather than within countries, the study finds that there is a constant return to scale: When war intensity (conflict deaths) double, the number of refugees doubles.¹⁹⁷ The sensitivity analysis shows that change in the number of conflict events has a relative influence of 14% when it comes to predicting the coming year's displacement and is ranked first among the variables tested, followed by change in the total number of fatalities (relative influence of 13%) and total number of civilian fatalities (11%). Change in the latter is ranked ninth and has a relative influence of 3%

The type of violence also has an impact on displacement. One study has found that civil war has the largest impact on displacement, followed by genocide/politicide.¹⁹⁸ Another study has found that the dynamics of civil war, while leading to displacement, tends to have a higher share of internally displaced than genocides or state violence targeting civilians. The argument is that insurgents or rebels in civil wars are targeting the government and need the support of the local population and thus seek to provide pockets of safe havens within the country to which populations can flee and seek safety rather than having to cross borders.¹⁹⁹

The ability to flee and whether individuals cross borders or stay as internally displaced also depends also on the available **economic** means. The network analysis does not find a strong direct relationship between the economic indicators (unemployment, GDP per capita and inequality). Other studies have found that ownership of physical capital reduces the incentive to flee, as does the level of ability to transfer occupational skills.²⁰⁰ For example, pastoralists are less likely to leave because transferability of their skills is limited.²⁰¹ A study has found that the higher the share of young males aged 15-19 in the country of origin, the higher the number of asylum claims. This is because younger people are more able and willing to leave than older people.²⁰²

Overall economic development also matters. One study has found that when GDP per capita increases in the origin countries, there are fewer asylum applications from that country in the EU.²⁰³ Another study has found that there is a breaking point at around USD 10,000 per capita, at which predicted displacement to the EU starts to decrease. However, the study finds that, overall, socioeconomic conditions are not well-suited to explain temporal changes in asylum flow towards the EU, but rather should be seen as shaping the latent migration potential of a given country.²⁰⁴ Instead, studies should consider the way economics interacts with conflict. As with human rights, the relationship goes both ways. In the network analysis, there appears a positive relationship between conflict and the economic variables GDP per capita and inequality (GINI index), while not having an impact on unemployment. This may be somewhat counterintuitive but is likely explained by the fact that the data is restricted to only countries with a history of displacement. One explanation could be that in very poor

194 Melander, Erik & Öberg, Magnus. (2007): The Threat of Violence and Forced Migration: Geographical Scope Trumps Intensity of Fighting. *Civil Wars*. 9. 156-173. 10.1080/13698240701207310.

195 Clionadh Raleigh (2011): The search for safety: The effects of conflict, poverty and ecological influences on migration in the developing world, *Global Environmental Change*, Volume 21, Supplement 1, Pages S82-S93, ISSN 0959-3780, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.08.008>

196 Alessandra Conte & Silvia Migali (2019): The role of conflict and organized violence in international forced migration, *Demographic Research*, Volume 41, Article 14, 393-424

197 James D. Fearon & Andrew Shaver (2021): *Civil War Violence and Refugee Outflows*, Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC) Working Papers 25, Empirical Studies of Conflict Project.

198 Clionadh Raleigh (2011): The search for safety: The effects of conflict, poverty and ecological influences on migration in the developing world, *Global Environmental Change*, Volume 21, Supplement 1, Pages S82-S93, ISSN 0959-3780, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.08.008>

199 Moore, W. H. and Shellman, S. M. (2006): 'Refugee or Internally Displaced Person?: To Where Should One Flee?', *Comparative Political Studies*, 39(5), pp. 599-622.

doi: [10.1177/0010414005276457](https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414005276457).

200 Pratikshya Bohra-Mishra & Douglas S. Massey (2011): Individual Decisions to Migrate During Civil Conflict, *Demography* 48:401-424 DOI 10.1007/s13524-011-0016-5

201 Clionadh Raleigh (2011): The search for safety: The effects of conflict, poverty and ecological influences on migration in the developing world, *Global Environmental Change*, Volume 21, Supplement 1, Pages S82-S93, ISSN 0959-3780, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.08.008>

202 Alessandra Conte & Silvia Migali (2019): The role of conflict and organized violence in international forced migration, *Demographic Research*, Volume 41, Article 14, 393-424

203 Alessandra Conte & Silvia Migali (2019): The role of conflict and organized violence in international forced migration, *Demographic Research*, Volume 41, Article 14, 393-424

204 Schutte, S., Vestby, J., Carling, J. et al. (2021): Climatic conditions are weak predictors of asylum migration. *Nat Commun* 12, 2067 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-22555-4>

countries (i.e. those with very low GDP per capita) there is less conflict potential because the gain from winning a conflict such as a civil war is limited. However, in those countries where there are some resources – albeit still limited from a global perspective – there is more reason to initiate conflict. More generally, one study has found that on average a USD 1,000 lower per capita income results in a 41% greater annual risk of civil war onset²⁰⁵ while another found that a five percentage-point decrease in annual economic growth increases the risk of civil conflict by 12 percentage points.²⁰⁶ Another argument is that conflict is not as much about economic growth, but rather the type of growth. The traditional economic view of conflict is that it is driven by large inequalities in income and wealth. If growth and economic change is not evenly distributed among the population, this can lead to conflict because it changes the relative income status of different groups.²⁰⁷ Evidence for this argument can be found in Colombia, where researchers have compared the impact on conflict of changes in oil and coffee prices. They found that violence increases when oil prices increase because more municipal revenue is siphoned through rapacity. On the other hand, when coffee prices increase – the production of which is labour intensive – wages increase, which then lowers workers' incentives to join armed groups and thus violence decreases.²⁰⁸ The sensitivity analysis finds that changes in economic inequality is ranked as the fifth most important variable in predicting next year's displacement and has a relative influence of 6%.

However, conflict has an impact on the economy. Several studies have shown that conflict has a negative impact on the economic development of a country, for example as a result of destruction of resources and diversion of public expenditure. One recent study finds that a median-size conflict can lead to a 15% decrease in GDP per capita by 15% and that countries experiencing conflict will have difficulty in dealing with such an economic shock to close the gap caused by the conflict. A median conflict country will be 10% under the economic trajectory it would otherwise have been on had it not experienced conflict.²⁰⁹

Conflict and economic performance are bound up with **state legitimacy**, which is another important element in shaping displacement. The network analysis shows that when a country is in the worst quartile when it comes to state legitimacy, in 25% of the cases more than 7% of the population will be displaced. One study has found that a one-point increase towards democratisation reduces the risk of large-scale forced displacement by 10%.²¹⁰ Another study has also found a positive correlation between changes in the political structures of a state towards autocracy and the overall number of displaced persons from that country.²¹¹ This can happen in a vicious circle whereby conflict disrupts the economy, in turn limiting the available resources for the government to ensure its capacity and ability to provide public services, which in turn makes it less able to solve the conflict and rebuild the economy, thus further undermining its legitimacy and fuelling further conflict and economic decline.²¹² The sensitivity analysis finds that the level of public services is ranked as the eighth-most-important variable in predicting the next year's displacement and has a relative influence of 4%. A similar pattern can be seen in several of the countries highlighted in this report. A weak state with limited capacity to uphold the monopoly of force and provide services becomes challenged by non-state armed actors, this further erodes the state legitimacy in that it cannot respond to these challenges and thus citizens themselves have to organise themselves into vigilante groups to provide a level of security for their own community. However, these groups become a security threat for other communities and end up fuelling the very insecurity they were established to decrease. The presence of these groups – sometimes sponsored by national or local authorities – again further erode the state's legitimacy and complicates the re-establishment of monopoly of force.

The impact of **environmental** factors on the 'displacement DNA' is also important. Several of the countries in this study are affected by adverse environmental conditions, often facing hazards such as droughts and floods. In South Sudan, an estimated 800,000 people have been affected by floods since May 2021. In the network analysis there is only a slight increase in displacement risk as the number of people affected by natural disasters or the occurrence of natural disasters increase.

205 Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003): Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *The American Political Science Review*, 97(1), 75–90. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118222>

206 Miguel, E., Satyanath, S., & Sergenti, E. (2004): Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach. *Journal of Political Economy*, 112(4), 725–753. <https://doi.org/10.1086/421174>

207 Debraj Ray & Joan Esteban (2017): Conflict and Development, *Annual Review of Economics*, 9:263–93

208 Oeindrila Dube & Juan F. Vargas (2013): Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia, *The Review of Economic Studies*, Volume 80, Issue 4, October, Pages 1384–1421, <https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdt009>

209 Scott Gates, Håvard Hegre, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård & Håvard Strand (2012): Development Consequences of Armed Conflict, *World Development*, Volume 40, Issue 9, 1713–1722, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.04.031>.


210 Murat Bayar & Mustafa M. Aral (30 October 2019): *An Analysis of Large-Scale Forced Migration in Africa*, International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health

211 Clionadh Raleigh (2011): The search for safety: The effects of conflict, poverty and ecological influences on migration in the developing world, *Global Environmental Change*, Volume 21, Supplement 1, Pages S82–S93, ISSN 0959-3780, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.08.008>

212 Debraj Ray & Joan Esteban (2017): Conflict and Development, *Annual Review of Economics*, 9:263–93

However, these two elements are found to have a stronger link to conflict where there is an associated higher risk of battle-related deaths and civilian fatalities. Generally, the evidence related to the impacts of the environment and climate change impact on displacement and conflict has been ambiguous and suffers from conceptual issues, lack of strong methodologies and appropriate data. One of the challenges is that the impact of climate change can involve cumulative effects that take several years and tipping points that are difficult to establish; thus, different methods and time-lags are necessary to capture these effects.²¹³ One recent study has found that climate risk could be used to predict forced displacement, but only after omitting conflict from the model, which seems to confirm the findings of the network analysis: that climate and environmental factors work through conflict to affect displacement. Specific relationships between environmental factors and conflict have been established – for example, increased rainfall decreases the likelihood of civil conflict in Africa. Others have found a relationship between natural disasters and violent civil conflicts for the period 1950–2000.²¹⁴ Others argue that the way to understand the link between displacement and climate change / environmental factors is to see it as a factor shaping the ability of communities and individuals to cope in the face of instability. As highlighted earlier, most often people live for many years in unstable environments and only as a last resort decide to leave. But if a natural hazard hits, such as below-average rainfall or the flooding of farmland, livelihoods are destroyed, food insecurity increases and markets are disrupted. Such events can so erode the coping capacity of communities that people that have to flee.²¹⁵ The sensitivity analysis finds that the prevalence of undernourishment is ranked as the fourth-most-important variable in predicting next year's displacement and has a relative influence of 7%

Lastly, displacement in itself is a relevant predictor of the coming year's displacement. Previous change in total displacement is ranked as the sixth-most-important variable in predicting next year's displacement and has a relative influence of 6%. The number of internally displaced persons is ranked as the tenth-most-important variable and has a relative influence of 3%. It is not immediately obvious why the previous change in displacement is more influential, but across the time series for change in total displacement in all 26 countries there is a tendency for an anticorrelation with a lag of 2. This can be seen in the graph below, which shows the partial autocorrelation function for all 26 countries.



The numbers for total displacement appear to have had a structure such that rises have a duration of two years, after which the numbers drop again.

213 Murat Bayar & Mustafa M. Aral (30 October 2019): *An Analysis of Large-Scale Forced Migration in Africa*, International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health

214 Murat Bayar & Mustafa M. Aral (30 October 2019): *An Analysis of Large-Scale Forced Migration in Africa*, International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health

215 Schutte, S., Vestby, J., Carling, J. et al. (2021): Climatic conditions are weak predictors of asylum migration. *Nat Commun* 12, 2067 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-22255-4>

The ten variables with highest relative influence on the displacement the next year are summarised in the table below.


Variable	Relative Influence	Source
Change in conflict events	14.1%	Pettersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högladh, Margareta Sollenberg & Magnus Öberg (2021). Organized violence 1989–2020, with a special emphasis on Syria. <i>Journal of Peace Research</i> 58(4).
Change in total conflict fatalities	12.9%	Pettersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högladh, Margareta Sollenberg & Magnus Öberg (2021). Organized violence 1989-2020, with a special emphasis on Syria. <i>Journal of Peace Research</i> 58(4).
Civilian fatalities	11.2%	Pettersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högladh, Margareta Sollenberg & Magnus Öberg (2021). Organized violence 1989-2020, with a special emphasis on Syria. <i>Journal of Peace Research</i> 58(4).
Change in prevalence of undernourishment	7.4%	FAO
Change in economic inequality	6.3%	Fragile State Index
Previous change in total displacement	5.8%	DRC calculations combining IDMC and UNHCR data
Human Rights Score	5.6%	Fariss, Christopher; Michael Kenwick; Kevin Reuning, 2020, 'Latent Human Rights Protection Scores Version 4', https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RQ85GK , Harvard DataverseHarvard Dataverse
Public services	3.9%	Fragile State Index
Change in civilian fatalities	3.1%	Pettersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högladh, Margareta Sollenberg & Magnus Öberg (2021). Organized violence 1989-2020, with a special emphasis on Syria. <i>Journal of Peace Research</i> 58(4).
Number of internally displaced people	2.8%	IDMC

About the Foresight Model

Framework

The Foresight model is based on a theoretical framework that focuses on the root causes or macro-level drivers of displacement. The dimensions and associated indicators have been grouped into five categories:

- 1. Economy:** Covers the economic well-being and equality in a given country
- 2. Security:** Covers the level of violence, different types of violence and fatalities
- 3. Political/Governance:** Covers aspects related to the legitimacy of the state, public service provisions and human rights
- 4. Environment:** Covers aspects related to climate disasters, access to water, agricultural stress and food security
- 5. Societal:** Covers aspects related to marginalised groups, urbanisation, size and composition



Data

The data is all derived from open source. The main data sources are the World Bank development indicators, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), EM-DAT, UN agencies (UNHCR, the World Food Programme, The Food and Agriculture Organization), Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), etc. In total, the system aggregates data from 18 sources, and contains 148 indicators.

The data on forced displacement depends wholly on the numbers from UNHCR and IDMC. These organisations make an extraordinary effort to collect and verify the numbers. Even so, gathering these numbers are difficult and the total forced displacement numbers used in the modelling may leave out some that have been displaced in 2021

Given that the data is taken from reputable data sources, the data is deemed to be highly reliable. However, the data has a few shortcomings. Coverage is uneven across geographies and across dimensions. For instance, economic and labour statistics tend to have better availability compared to governance and violence statistics. Data from institutional providers can often have a delay. The most recent indicators can be a few years old. The data is collected globally.

The system uses several methods to address data gaps. We distinguish between the missing data in the features (or indicators) and missing target variable (i.e. forced displacement). Data with missing target variables is simply excluded from training. For missing values in indicators, we employ two methods. To address data lag, we make indicator projections for each country using an auto-regressive model (i.e. AR(n) model). An auto-regressive model is a time-series forecasting model where future values depend only on previous values of the variable. The 'n' denotes the number of lag variables and is determined using a heuristic approach. For cases where data is insufficient, we simply treat it as missing, which is better than projecting incorrectly. Intermediate missing values are computed by interpolation.

We follow a simple standardisation scheme, intended to keep data-ingestion tasks lightweight. A data transformer is implemented for each of the data sources to ensure that each indicator data point is associated with a country and year. The resulting dataset can be cross-referenced and serves as input to the model.


For training we limit the data to that for the period 1995 to 2020, the latest data available for displacement. For cross validation, we use a five-year period: 2015-2020. Following the standard cross-validation set-up for time-series data, models are trained on data for the years (1995, y) and predictions made for y+t, where y is in the five-year time period.

Model

The machine learning model employed is an Ensemble. An Ensemble model works by leveraging several constituent models to generate independent forecasts that are then aggregated. Here we employ two gradient-boosted trees to generate the point forecasts. The model hyperparameters were determined by means of a grid search. Each year-ahead forecast has a separate model. In other words, we train a set of Ensemble models for $y(t+h) = f(x(t))$, where $h = 0, 1, 2, 3$. The associated confidence intervals were generated by empirical bootstrap method, where the source error distributions were generated on a retrospective analysis. Model training data was limited to data from 1995 onwards.

Accuracy

Overall, the average margin of error of the 188 forecasts made so far is 19%. 50% of the forecasts have a margin of error below 10% and almost 2/3 of the forecasts are less than 15% off the actual displacement.



Major missed forecasts in 2021 include:

- DR Congo: 8.3 million forecasted vs. 6.7 million estimated displaced
- Afghanistan: 6.4 million forecasted vs. 7.1 million estimated displaced
- Colombia: 4.9 million forecasted vs. 5.2 million estimated displaced

Most accurate forecasts in 2021 include:

- Niger: 293,516 forecasted vs. 286,989 estimated displaced
- Burundi: 402,000 forecasted vs. 410,616 estimated displaced
- Cameroon: 1,132,925 forecasted vs. 1,142,282 estimated displaced

Limitations

The model tends to be conservative. Of the current 150+ forecasts derived from the model, approximately two-thirds underestimate the level of displacement for the coming year. The forecasts are based solely on data and developments up until the previous year (i.e. 2020). As such, recent developments are not taken into account. In the current forecasts, countries such as Myanmar and Central African Republic are forecasted to have limited increases in displacement, but significant displacement has already taken place as a result of unforeseen events.

Because the model is built around national-level indicators, it does not perform as well in cases where conflict and displacement are largely regionally confined.

Given the methodology of building on historical trends and patterns, the model generally does not tend to capture unprecedented developments.

2021 Displacement Estimates

As mentioned in the introduction, official figures for the number of displaced people displaced in 2021 will not be available until around June 2022. The IDP figures are typically released by IDMC in May, while the figures on refugees and asylum seekers are released by UNHCR in June. However, it is possible to estimate the number of displaced persons with a fair degree of accuracy by building on displacement updates being provided. These include:

- UNHCR mid-year displacement figures
- IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) assessment data on IDPs
- UNHCR 'Situation' website providing regional data on refugee and asylum-seeker figures for certain crises
- OCHA and UNHCR country operation pages

The table below shows the numbers and sources for the estimates.

Country Code	IDP 2020	IDP 2021	IDP Update date	IDP link	EDP 2020	EDP 2021	EDP Update date	EDP source	Total displ. 2020	Total displ. 2021
BFA	1075000	1579976	31-12-2021	Link	24607	28971	30-06-2021	UNHCR mid-year update	1099607	1608947
CMR	1003000	936767	30-11-2021	Link	101499	105515	30-06-2021		1104499	1042282
CAF	682000	669791	30-11-2021	Link	657288	743948	30-06-2021 & 30-11-2021	UNHCR mid-year update (outside region) + UNHCR situation website (in region)	1339288	1413739
MLI	326000	401736	30-09-2021	Link	175724	188065	30-06-2021	UNHCR mid-year update	501724	589801
NER	257000	264257	30-11-2021	Link	22957	22732	30-06-2021	UNHCR mid-year update	279957	286989
NGA	2730000	3033363	31-10-2021	Link	426180	447312	30-06-2021 & 30-11-2021	UNHCR mid-year update (outside region) + UNHCR situation website (in region)	3156180	3480675
BDI	22000	22000			439707	388616	30-06-2021		461707	410616
COD	5268000	5600000	31-12-2021	Link	999840	1025084	30-06-2021 & 31-10-2021	UNHCR mid-year update (outside region) + UNHCR situation website (in region)	6267840	6625084
ETH	4000000	4239636	31-07-2021	Link	279965	283331	30-06-2021	UNHCR mid-year update	4279965	4522967
SOM	2968000	2970000	30-11-2021	Link	866202	844055	30-06-2021 & 30-11-2021	UNHCR mid-year update (outside region) + UNHCR situation website (in region)	3834202	3814055
SSD	1436000	2017236	30-11-2021	Link	2193699	2281330	30-06-2021 & 30-11-2021	UNHCR mid-year update (outside region) + UNHCR situation website (in region)	3629699	4298566
AFG	3547000	4237200	18-10-2021	Link	2838521	2841502	30-06-2021 & 31-08-2021	UNHCR mid-year update (outside region) + UNHCR situation website (in region)	6385521	7078702
MMR	505000	825000	31-12-2021	Link	1143604	1171820	30-06-2021	UNHCR mid-year update	1648604	1996820
COL	4922000	4975159	31-10-2021	Link	260796	210272	30-06-2021	UNHCR mid-year update	5182796	5185431
SLV	71500	71500	31-08-2021	Link	213708	221643	30-06-2021	UNHCR mid-year update	285208	293143
GTM	242000	242000			187060	198029	30-06-2021		429060	440029
HND	247000	247000	31-08-2021	Link	296618	314026	30-06-2021	UNHCR mid-year update	543618	561026
IRQ	1224000	1189581	30-09-2021	Link	605161	632677	30-06-2021	UNHCR mid-year update	1829161	1822258
SYR	6568000	6700000	31-05-2021	Link	6817816	6886647	30-06-2021	UNHCR mid-year update	13385816	13586647
YEM	3635000	3792362	31-12-2021	Link	54994	68958	30-06-2021	UNHCR mid-year update	3689994	3861320
LBY	278000	199949	30-09-2021	Link	23048	24021	30-06-2021	UNHCR mid-year update	301048	223970
SDN	2276000	3036593	31-07-2021	Link	857667	876328	30-06-2021	UNHCR mid-year update	3133667	3912921
UKR	734000	734000			56587	53479	30-06-2021		790587	787479
TCD	342000	457948	30-09-2021	Link	16681	16394	30-06-2021	UNHCR mid-year update	358681	474342
VEN	0	0			4884479	5083414	30-06-2021		4884479	5083414
MOZ	676000	745000	30-11-2021	Link	8755	8799	30-06-2021	UNHCR mid-year update	684755	753799

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ANNEX

Overview of displacement forecasts for all countries for 2022 and 2023

Country	2021 (estimate)	2022 (forecast)	2023 (forecast)	Change between 2021-2023
Afghanistan	7,063,146	7,397,364	7,772,128	708,982 (10%)
Burkina Faso	1,530,746	2,024,714	2,346,553	815,807 (53%)
Burundi	410,616	396,249	398,187	-12,429 (-3%)
Cameroon	1,142,282	1,450,406	1,611,655	469,373 (41%)
CAR	1,426,874	1,445,111	1,404,852	-22,022 (-2%)
Chad	474,342	590,840	441,581	-32,761 (-7%)
Colombia	5,185,431	5,229,808	5,339,518	154,087 (3%)
DR Congo	6,721,790	7,270,224	8,562,811	1,841,021 (27%)
El Salvador	293,143	302,781	362,406	69,263 (24%)
Ethiopia	4,522,967	4,595,069	5,472,215	949,248 (21%)
Guatemala	440,029	446,928	454,914	14,885 (3%)
Honduras	561,026	587,171	664,671	103,645 (18%)
Iraq	1,822,258	1,634,367	1,404,740	-417,518 (-23%)
Libya	223,970	187,422	204,438	-19,532 (-9%)
Mali	589,801	685,973	747,673	157,872 (27%)
Mozambique	753,799	790,879	1,036,297	282,498 (37%)
Myanmar	1,886,320	1,889,980	2,006,769	120,449 (6%)
Niger	286,989	303,726	412,730	125,741 (44%)
Nigeria	3,490,153	3,693,521	4,302,827	812,674 (23%)
Somalia	3,828,654	4,051,199	4,403,529	574,875 (15%)
South Sudan	4,061,623	4,543,164	4,895,167	833,544 (21%)
Sudan	3,912,921	4,050,789	2,880,572	-1,032,349 (-26%)
Syria	13,586,647	13,766,423	13,945,373	358,726 (3%)
Ukraine	787,479	778,115	761,279	-26,200 (-3%)
Venezuela	5,083,414	5,224,766	5,135,672	52,258 (1%)
Yemen	3,861,320	3,900,146	4,219,377	358,057 (9%)



Founded in 1956, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) is Denmark's largest international NGO, with a specific expertise in forced displacement. DRC is present in close to 40 countries and employs 9,000 staff globally.

DRC advocates for the rights of and solutions for displacement-affected communities, and provides assistance during all stages of displacement: In acute crisis, in exile, when settling and integrating in a new place, or upon return. DRC supports displaced persons in becoming self-reliant and included into hosting societies. DRC works with civil society and responsible authorities to promote protection of rights and inclusion.

Our 7,500 volunteers in Denmark make an invaluable difference in integration activities throughout the country.

DRC's code of conduct sits at the core of our organizational mission, and DRC aims at the highest ethical and professional standards. DRC has been certified as meeting the highest quality standards according to the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability.

HRH Crown Princess Mary is DRC's patron.

To read more about what we do, see: www.drc.ngo

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